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Abstract 
This thesis attempts to explain the impact of international forces on the democratization 
processes of Turkey and Greece after the most recent overt military inverventions in 
those countries. The International Community imposed harsh sanctions on the Greek 
junta and contributed to delegetimization of the military regime, whereas Turkish 
generals experienced a relatively more lenient international response. Preservation of 
legitimacy by the Turkish military adversly affected the consolidation process by 
securing institutional preregotatives for the military. In the consolidation phase, distrust 
between civilian and military elites, the failure of the international community to assure 
military elites that their interests will be protected after democratization, and its failure 
to utilize credible political conditionality preclueded Turkey from consolidating its 
democracy. In Greece, however, international actors were effective in the socialization 
of anti system parties and used political conditionality effectively in order to strenghten 
democracy. 
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ÖZ 
Bu tez uluslararası faktörlerin demokratikleşmeye katkısını, Türkiye ve Yunanistan’ın 
sırasıyla 1983 ve 1974’te gerçekleştirdikleri demokrasiye geçiş üzerinden, incelemeyi 
amaçlamaktadır. Uluslararası topluluk Yunanistan’daki askeri rejime görece daha sert 
yaptırımlar uygulayıp rejimin meşruiyetini kaybetmesinde rol oynarken, Türkiye’deki 
askeri yönetimin daha hoşgörülü bir uluslararası tutumla karşılandığı söylenebilir. Diğer 
nedenlerle birlikte, Türk askerinin siyasette geçirdiği üç yıldan sonra meşruiyetini 
koruması, askerin siyasetteki yerini pekiştirmiş ve demokrasinin güçlenmesi sürecini 
zorlaştırmıştır. Demokrasinin yerleşmesi sürecinde, asker ve sivil liderler arasındaki 
güvensizlik, uluslararası topluluğun askeri liderleri tam demokratikleşmeden sonra 
çıkarlarının korunacağı konusunda iknada başarısızlığı ve uluslararası demokratik 
koşullanmanın yetersiz ve temelsiz uygulanması Türkiye’de demokrasinin geleceği 
açısından yapıcı olmamıştır. Diğer yandan, Yunanistan’da uluslararası faktörler elitlere 
demokrasiye geçiş sonrası çıkarlarının korunacağına dair güvence vererek ve 
demokratik koşullanmanın etkin kullanımıyla Yunanistan’da demokrasinin 
güçlenmesine katkıda bulunmuştur. 
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0. INTRODUCTION 
In the mid-twentieth century, the fall of the German Weimar Republic and the 
establishment of successive totalitarian and authoritarian regimes evoked interest among 
political scientists in regime breakdowns and re-democratization (Daalder, 1993, pp.14-
15). Since then, the most distinguished scholars of the field set forth various useful 
explanations on democracy and democratization (See for example Dahl, 1998; 
Schmitter and Karl, 1996; Lijphart, 1999; Diamond, 1996; Linz, 1978; Huntington, 
1996; Rustow, 1970). Huntington, for instance, claims that culture can preclude or be 
conducive to democratization. On the other hand, Bermeo (1992) refutes that culture, 
per se, can be determinant of democracy while simultaneously asserting that the 
political learning of elites from authoritarian past is a determining factor for 
democratization. As opposed to Huntington and Bermeo, Rustow (1970) contends that 
no matter in which culture, democratization is a deliberate decision which is taken by 
the elites of the country. In support of Rustow, Burton, Gunther and Highley (1992) 
affirm that in the process of democratization elite consensual unity is the basic engine of 
democratization attempts. That is, elites of the country shall come into consensus on 
democracy in order to realize successful democratization. Nonetheless, disagreeing with 
cultural and elite explanations to democratization, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens (1992) argue that democracy transpires via class struggle in the society. 
Indeed, when the labor class gets stronger, it would demand democratic rights from 
upper classes and eventually upper classes would be obliged to consent to 
democratization.  
Whereas there is a remarkable scholarly debate on domestic sources of 
democratization, the literature on the international context of democratization remains 
limited. Although, it is commonly acknowledged that international actors are significant 
players in the democratization process of a country (Huntington, 1996), their role and 
importance are usually neglected. This might be partly attributed to the fact that the 
impact of external sources on democratization is less visible and empirically less 
measurable (Pridham, 1991, p.2). 
However, explanations on process of democratization without reference to 
international actors would remain incomplete. They would be disregarding a significant 
variable which might have considerable impact on the process of democratization in 
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interaction with domestic factors. Elite political learning and elite socialization, for 
instance, can be stimulated by the international legitimization of pro-democratic elites at 
home. International actors can be effective in supporting elite consensual unity by 
encouraging domestic elites to give a deliberate decision in favor of democracy by 
providing credible incentives. Transnational party links, on the other hand, might be an 
engine in creating class consciousness among the working class at home. Therefore, the 
impact of international forces on democratization requires to be assessed by scholarly 
attention in order to provide explanations beyond those speculations. Analysis and 
scholarly assessment of international context of democratization would be contributing 
to the understanding of democratization in general. 
Acknowledging the significance of domestic explanations, this thesis intends to 
analyze the impact of the international forces on democratization.  It poses the question: 
How do international forces affect the process of democratization in a country? In order 
to answer this question, throughout this thesis, I will focus on the mechanisms linking 
international forces to democratization; the tools that are used by international actors in 
order to affect the process of democratization; and the scope and limits of their impact. 
I will argue that international actors can stimulate collapse of authoritarian 
regimes and encourage the transition to democracy by diplomatically isolating the 
regime, imposing economic sanctions upon it, supporting and legitimizing the pro-
democratic domestic opposition, and finally, by fertilizing democratic culture via elite 
socialization and the agency of media. I will conclude that even if all those means might 
be effective in the process of transition, elite socialization possesses prime importance 
for establishing a democratic regime in the country. In addition to elite socialization, 
international actors might deprive the existing authoritarian regime of legitimacy during 
the phase of transition which prepares a more conducive setting for consolidation of 
democracy. During the consolidation phase, international actors might support 
democracy by assuring key elites that democratization will be in their interest, and 
through elite socialization and membership conditionality. I will argue that those 
mechanisms are ultimately interrelated while failure to ensure one would be reducing 
the impact of the other. Finally, I will contend that international factors function strictly 
in relation to domestic factors and it might be misleading to ignore the interaction 
between these two sets of variables.  
12 
 
 
Cases: Turkish and Greek Democratization in 1983 and in 1974, respectively 
In order to respond to questions, concerning the impact of international forces on 
democratization, I will comparatively analyze the Turkish and Greek democratization 
cases in 1983 and in 1974 respectively for three reasons. First, the Turkish and Greek 
cases represent plain examples of external impact on democratization. Both Turkey and 
Greece, at the time of their democratization, were largely integrated in the international 
system. Moreover, in both cases, international institutions of which they were members 
were interested in and supportive of democratization in those countries. Second, an 
analysis of two cases facilitates analyzing the impact of the international forces on 
democratization by allowing extensive control of the dependent variable. In other 
words, the Turkish and Greek cases vary in terms of their transition path and 
consolidation attempts while most of the other variables could be held constant to a 
large extent. Indeed, Greece and Turkey are located in the common geography of 
Mediterranean, have passed through similar historical and modernization processes and 
still possess similar domestic political patterns. Moreover, Turkey and Greece 
experienced democratization in similar time periods, in 1983 and in 1974, respectively 
and under similar international influences as the associate members of the European 
Community, NATO allies and members to the Council of Europe, OSCE, and OECD. 
Thirdly, Turkey and Greece both completed their transition periods in a relatively short 
time period. However, their democracies evolved in different directions and Greece 
consolidated its democracy in the mid-1980s whereas Turkey is still on the path of 
consolidation. Therefore, these cases are helpful in order to measure the impact of 
international forces on democratic consolidation. 
 
Concepts: Democracy, Transition, and Democratic Consolidation 
Before further deepening analysis, it is crucial to define what the international 
forces are, and to clarify the concepts of democracy, democratic transition and 
consolidation. First of all, borrowing from Pridham (1995) the independent variable that 
is international factors in this thesis will refer to “outside actors- international 
organizations, foreign governments, transnational nongovernmental actors” (Pridham, 
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1995, p.171). External influence is the substance and direction of those actors’ impact 
on transition. That is, an actor might facilitate or hinder democratization by inserting 
influence on a country and do so to a varying degree. This thesis aims to investigate 
both the direction and degree of this external influence with respect to relevant actors.  
Evidently, it is hard to reach clear cut generalizations about actors in each 
particular case. For instance, democratization processes of Turkey and Greece in 1983 
and 1974 respectively could not be explained without reference to the European 
Community; whereas, while explaining democratization processes of Central and 
Eastern European countries, one cannot neglect the impact of the Soviet Union in 
addition to other relevant actors and external influence. Moreover, list of foreign 
governments, included in transition cannot be exhaustive; since, impact of some 
countries is aggregated in the general stance of an international organization such as 
Council of Europe or the European Community, which claim to be representing member 
states. Neither is it possible to name constant actors for each and every democratization 
case. Hence, it might be challenging to name those relevant actors for a particular case.  
Therefore, in order to include an actor, capacity to insert influence with the 
purpose of affecting transition will be considered. In order to consider an actor, I will 
examine three factors: first interest of the international actor in democratization in the 
country- otherwise it would be unwilling to affect the process, second, its relative 
impact and significance in the foreign policy formation of the country- otherwise the 
impact would be too insignificant to include, and third, receptiveness of the country 
towards this impact- otherwise the country would not respond to pressure. By utilizing 
the above mentioned criteria, those actors will be named for the Turkish and Greek 
democratization cases in the relevant chapters. 
Secondly, the dependent variable, democratization, requires the clarity of 
concepts like democracy, democratic transition, and democratic consolidation. With 
respect to democracy, for the purposes of this thesis, Robert Dahl’s investigation of 
defining features of a democratic system is useful. Dahl (1998, p.84) assumes that none 
of the actual democracies in the world could achieve ultimate implementation of the 
ideal of democracy. Hence instead of ‘democracy,’ he prefers the term polyarchy. 
Polyarchies have six identifying features: significant political offices are occupied by 
elected officials, free and fair elections are held in reasonable time intervals, freedom of 
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expression concerning political matters is established and protected, citizens have 
access to different sources of information, citizens enjoy associational autonomy which 
implies their right to form associations including political parties in order to seek their 
interest at the political level and finally, inclusive citizenship allows all adults in a 
country to formally enjoy the above mentioned rights (Dahl, 1998, p. 85). 
Philippe Schmitter and Lynn Karl (1996, pp.50-55) complement Dahl’s 
polyarchy model. They accept six features that Dahl counts. However they criticize him 
for equating democracy with formal electoral institutions- what they call ‘electoralism’. 
In order fulfill the gap between electoralism and real life definition of democracy; they 
bring two more criteria to define a democratic system. The first one is absence of 
tutelary control over the government by a non- elected body, i.e. armed forces. The 
second one is independence from any other political system, i.e. absence of 
“neocolonial arrangements”. (Karl and Schmitter, 1996, p.55) Since under the control of 
any other political system or under the tutelage of a non-elected body, free and fair 
elections and offices to be held by elected representatives as the result of those elections 
would not be meaningful and they would be restricted to formalities.  
In this thesis, barrowing from Dahl, and Karl and Schmitter, the term democracy 
will refer to a system where officials are elected to political posts by free and fair 
elections in which virtually all adults participate as candidates and/or voters, and rights 
such as associational autonomy, right to reach different sources of information, and 
freedom of expression are respected and protected. In addition, the democratic system 
must remain free from the direct impact of any other political system and any non-
elected bodies, including the military. In order to consider a case democracy, the 
military must not exercise tutelary control over elected officials. 
Democracy and democratic systems are not static phenomena. Democracies 
might collapse, be reestablished and for certain cases be stiffened following 
reestablishment.  Reestablishment or establishment of above-mentioned institutions, 
rights and features of democracy is named democratic transition. In fact, according to 
Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros (1995, p.3), “Transition begins with the breakdown 
of the former authoritarian regime and ends with the establishment of relatively stable 
configuration of political institutions within a democratic regime”. On the other hand, 
democratic consolidation implies strengthening of those institutions and can be defined 
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as “…the achievement of substantial attitudinal support for and behavioral compliance 
with the new democratic institutions and the rules of the game which they establish” 
(Gunther et al., 1995, p. 3). As they are fundamentally different phenomena and refer to 
different stages of democratization, I will analyze two stages of democratization 
separately in this thesis.  
The definition of democratic consolidation, however, requires further 
clarifications. The first question is whose attitudinal support is necessary for 
consolidation. Gunther et al. (1995, p.7) contends that it is mainly the politically 
significant groups which they define as “powerful elites”. However, they acknowledge 
the ability of the masses to challenge legitimacy of the system, as well. In this sense, 
masses present a negative force.  They can be organized in the axis of an anti-system 
movement and be capable of hindering democracy. Yet, they do not possess sufficient 
capability to establish democratic consolidation. (Gunther et al., 1995, p. 7) Second 
question is how the attitudinal support can be defined. According to Gunther et al. 
(1995, p.15), “absence of serious conflict among politically significant groups over the 
acceptability of basic framework for political contestation” points attitudinal support for 
the regime. However, as Gunther et al. (1995, p.15), affirm, attitudinal support does not 
refer to abstract concepts of political culture or civic traditions1. Rather, it implies 
legitimacy and basic acceptance of those political institutions among political actors. In 
this thesis, attitudinal support in relation to democratic consolidation will be used in 
reference to this interpretation. 
In summary, we can define transition as the collapse of the previous 
authoritarian regime and the establishment of relatively stable democratic institutions 
such as free and fair elections and universal suffrage. Consolidation, on the other hand, 
refers to the acceptance and sustainability of those institutions. Following chapters of 
this thesis will discuss the impact of the international actors on these two stages of 
democratization. The first chapter will be devoted to the impact of external actors on 
transition to democracy in Turkey and in Greece in 1983 and 1974 respectively. The 
second chapter will dwell upon the international context of democratic consolidation in 
these two cases. In the final chapter, I will conclude by summing up theoretical 
                                                            
1 For discussion on political culture and civic tradition, see Almond (1980) and Lane 
(1992).  
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generalizations about the impact of international forces on democratization, derived 
from the democratization cases of Turkey and Greece in 1983 and in 1974 respectively. 
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I. Explaining External Influence on Transition to Democracy in Turkey and in 
Greece: Socializing National Elites into Democracy 
Regimes determine who rules on what basis and concomitantly alter all state-
society relations, societal formation, and civil institutional design. Hence, at the macro 
level, regimes determine the relevant political power holders, tools and mechanisms of 
their power, as well as bilateral relations between the individual, collectivity, and the 
state. In this respect, regime question is of crucial importance for every single citizen 
and one of the principal topics of inquiry for students of political science. Regime 
change ultimately leads to wholesale alternation of all those relations within a polity and 
has attracted substantial attention from various scholars.  
Linz (1978, pp.51-53), for instance, concerns with the underlying reasons of 
breakdown of democratic regimes into authoritarianism and asserts that what causes 
breakdown is inability of elites to find a solution to crisis situations within the political 
system. On the reverse side of regime breakdown, Rustow (1970, pp.350-361) engages 
in with the question of transition to democracy and sorts out four steps of transition to 
democracy: political unity of citizens as a background condition, emergence of an 
unsolvable conflict in the preparatory phase, deliberate solution to that conflict in favor 
of democracy by elites in the decision phase, and habituation phase. That is, citizens of 
a political unity which do not possess secessionist aspirations and agree to be belonging 
to the same political community might be divided among themselves due to an 
unsolvable problem, for example, extension of universal suffrage to newly mobilized 
groups, and eventually elites, among themselves, might decide to solve this problem by 
channelizing it through democratic institutions and making a deliberate decision in 
favor of establishing democracy. In the habituation phase, democracy turns into well-
rooted habit- which indeed points consolidation of the regime. On the contrary to elite-
based explanations of Rustow and Linz; Huntington (1996, pp.24-25) and other 
modernization theorists emphasize the level of socio-economic development as the 
determinant of establishing a democratic regime. To put it differently, level of socio-
economic development is positively correlated with the probability of establishing a 
democratic regime according to modernization theorists. Agreeing with Huntington on 
the significance of the level of economic development, Rueschemeyer, Stevens, and 
Stevens (1992) affirm that transition to democracy is rendered possible with capitalist 
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development, which alters relative class power and ability of working class to challenge 
the status quo.  
 
International Factors and Transition to Democracy: What is in the literature? 
Scholars have studied the relation between domestic factors such as socio-
economic development level, class structure, and elite strategic choices and transition to 
democracy. Yet, the impact of the international factors on transition is usually 
acknowledged as an additional variable, if not neglected as having marginal effect on 
democratization2. Nevertheless, this prejudice against impact of international factors 
seems to be eased with recent studies. In explaining the third wave of democratization, 
for instance, Huntington (1996, p.7) states ‘snowball effect’, implying that 
democratization wave started in a country or region, especially with geographical 
proximity, will have positive effects on democratization of its neighbors. Moreover, 
Huntington (1991, p.5) acknowledges the importance of the European Community in 
democratization processes of Southern European countries, namely democratizations of 
Portugal, Spain, and Greece in the mid 1970s and early 1980s.  
There are more recent studies which do not merely mention external factors as 
an additional variable but exclusively focus on them. One of the recent attempts is 
Anastassia Obydenkova’s statistical analysis of the assumed correlation between 
democratization and geographical proximity and/or communication and cooperation 
between the European Union (EU) and different regions of Russia (Obydenkova, 2007, 
pp.473-475). Through her case study, she concludes that geographical proximity has no 
significant impact on democratization, whilst cooperation and communication with the 
EU is positively correlated with democratization (pp.488-489). Obydenkova analyzes 
solely the impact of the EU on democratization to test the correlation between 
cooperation and communication and democratization. Indeed, there seems to be a 
consensus in the literature on the significance of the EU on democratization. Whitehead 
(1996, p.19), as well, points to the importance of the EU in the region and explains that 
level of economic and political integration the EU possesses help the organization to 
                                                            
2  See, for instance, Schmitter(1992,p.5) who basically claims that transition to 
democracy can be explained through domestic factors and international context presents 
only a marginal role which can be ignored due to its insignificance. 
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encourage regime transition by offering significant economic and political benefits to 
the neighboring countries. Furthermore, Pridham (1995, pp.179-180) argues that high 
level of political and economic integration enables the EU to penetrate into domestic 
politics and hence to have greater impact on democratization. Agreeing with Whitehead 
and Pridham, Kubicek (2003, pp.212- 214) asserts that EU conditionality is vital in 
encouraging regime transition in favor of democracy in countries in the zone of EU’s 
impact.  
All those scholars refer to democratization as if it is one compact phenomenon. 
Yet, failing to distinguish between transition to democracy and democratic 
consolidation and defining them broadly under the umbrella of the term democratization 
may lead to certain theoretical and practical problems since two terms refer to different 
processes. Theoretically, transition to democracy refers to the immediate collapse of the 
authoritarian regime and adoption of a ‘democracy-likely’ one with the minimum 
consideration of necessary institutionalization, while democratic consolidation refers to 
stiffening of those democratic institutions. To put it differently, transition refers to a 
negative process which is essentially the breakdown of the authoritarian regime, while 
consolidation is a positive process which embraces strengthening of democracy as the 
legitimate regime of the polity. Practically, as the definition of transition urges, in the 
collapse of the existing authoritarian regime and in encouragement of a democratic one, 
international actors other than the European Union might be effective. Institutions such 
as Council of Europe, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), OSCE 
(Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe), and OECD (Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development), IMF (International Monetary Fund), and the 
World Bank might be effective in de-legitimization of the authoritarian regime and they 
might encourage transition without penetrating into domestic politics as much as the 
European Union does. For democratic consolidation, on the other hand, high levels of 
political and economic integration might be required so as to allow high level of 
penetration into domestic politics. Therefore, focusing solely on the impact of the 
European Union and analyzing two stages of democratization at once may be 
misleading. 
 
Theorizing the International Impact on Transition to Democracy 
20 
 
Distinguishing between transition to democracy and democratic consolidation, 
Pridham (1991, p.214), contends that the impact of external forces, including the 
European Union (but certainly not limited to it), starts at the pre-transition period. 
International factors might foster liberalization within the existing regime; hence, they 
might facilitate transition. Liberalization attempts might not always aim at eventual 
democratization and might be even defensive in its character. They might be geared 
towards the survival of the regime or realization of pre-defined authoritarian objectives. 
Still, by guaranteeing a certain degree of regime opening, liberalization might help to 
prepare the basis for transition to democracy. In order to open up the regime, 
international actors might put pressure to the existing regime via hostile attitude, 
championing democratic values or by more credible political attempts. Those attempts 
signify the mechanisms and tools, used by the external actors in order to facilitate 
democratization and can be grouped under three general sub-headings.  
First one is diplomatic isolation (Pridham, 1991, p.215). International 
institutions and foreign governments can freeze their diplomatic ties with an 
authoritarian regime, refuse membership to certain international organizations such as 
Council of Europe, the European Community, OSCE, and OECD or deprive it from 
already-existing membership rights fully or partially. Diplomatic isolation might be 
highly effective via its two components. First, it delegitimizes the existing regime at 
home in the public eye. Second, the fact that the authoritarian regime is not accepted as 
legitimate by the international actors strengthens the opposition’s hand in gaining 
support of masses for democratization and simultaneously weakens the political basis of 
the regime at home.  
The second tool that international actors might use is economic sanctions.  
Diplomatic isolation might be accompanied by abandonment of economic relations, 
which aggregates the impact of de-legitimization by bringing extra economic burdens 
on the authoritarian regime. It leads to de-legitimization of the existing regime in the 
public eye by lowering its economic performance, and hence, negatively affects the 
sustainability of the regime. In addition, economic sanctions sometimes facilitate 
greater political influence. To put it differently, concrete economic sanctions provide 
credibility to the political stance of the international actors and their manifest support 
for democracy. Economic sanctions possess two components. First, international 
institutions and foreign governments might provide/deprive the country from direct 
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loans. Authoritarian regime is deprived of this kind of aid; this creates a negative impact 
on macro economic variables of the country by upsetting budgetary balance. The second 
one is freezing up of bilateral trade relations. This would deprive the authoritarian 
regime of welfare-enhancing feature of trade. In other words, it would cut its export 
revenues (Pridham, 1991, p.215). 
Third, in addition to indirect support via delegitimizing the current regime, 
external forces might directly support the opposition at home. First, transnational links 
that are established between the opposition and the international institutions, 
nongovernmental organizations, and/or foreign governments might provide legitimacy 
to the opposing forces against the authoritarian regime (Pridham, 1991, p.218). It is 
important to note that already-established legitimacy of the international actor in the 
country is a precondition for this mechanism to work. Otherwise, its support might even 
hinder legitimacy of the opposition. Second, external actors might “…protect the 
opposition from harassment by the authorities” (Latemendia,p.15 in Pridham, 1991, 
p.218). Since the existing regime knows that the opposition elites have certain allies 
abroad and support of those allies might be invoked in case of serious harassment, it 
might hesitate to seriously impeach certain rights and freedoms in the country. The 
current regime might bear the fear that already existing sanctions could be accelerated 
by the external forces. For instance, even though freedom of expression might be 
restricted by the authoritarian regime, some opposing newspapers might continue to be 
circulated due to external pressure in favor of the opposition. Third, transnational links 
between the external actors and opposing forces might “allow political parties or groups 
to prepare more effectively for the resumption of democratic politics” (Pridham, 1991, 
p.218).  The readiness of an opposition is an essential component of democracy. Larry 
Diamond (1996, pp.119-120) states that democracies are the systems which are 
designed to channel competing interests that are inherently in conflict. Protection 
against arbitrary policies of the authoritarian system and increasing credibility of the 
opposition guarantees smoother transition and better democratic mechanisms in the later 
stages. 
Finally, democratic culture can be fertilized and/or strengthened via 
transnational links.  External actors can be effective in transmitting democratic values 
under authoritarian regime (Pridham, 1991, p.219). Through their critical stance of the 
existing regime and by manifesting their opinion in favor of democracy, foreign 
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governments, international institutions, transnational nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO) might facilitate fertilization and/or nurture of democratic values at home. In 
other words, democratic values are celebrated by those actors while domestic actors are 
socialized into desirability of this regime. By capitalizing on transnational links, 
domestic actors sustain the ideal of democracy and facilitate diffusion of this ideal to 
the masses. Defining transition to democracy as the collapse of the previous 
authoritarian regime and the establishment of a democratic configuration, this ideal 
provides an alternative vision to be implemented once the regime collapses.  
Additionally, democratic culture is transmitted through the agency of media 
(Pridham, 1991, p.219). Media is the major tool, if nurturing democratic values is the 
goal. In service of this goal, media’s agency is double sided. First, it informs public 
opinion about criticisms directed to the authoritarian regime by those external actors 
and about the support for the opposition. Second, the opposition can utilize channels of 
media in order to invoke support for its cause and to inform the international 
community about human rights violations and/or political harassments of the authorities 
within the country. 
In this chapter, having defined transition to democracy as the collapse of the 
previous authoritarian regime and the establishment of relatively stable democratic 
configuration, I will, firstly, attempt to explain international influence in transition to 
democracy in Turkey and Greece in 1983 and 1974 respectively. I will test if diplomatic 
isolation, economic sanctions, support for the opposition offered by the international 
actors, and fertilization of democratic culture via external links and agency of media 
were effective in encouraging transition to democracy in these two cases. I will argue 
that the first three are implemented on the military regime in Turkey (1980-1983) with 
less intensity, compared to the Greek case. Despite the pressure of international actors, 
the Greek colonels’ regime came to end due to an extra-ordinary event- the Cyprus war 
(Karakatsanis, 2001, p.157). Thus, ironically, international pressure was more 
successful in encouraging voluntary disengagement of the Turkish military in a shorter 
time period in 1983. I will contend that this can be attributed to relevant interaction 
between domestic factors and the international forces in Turkey and in Greece. While 
the Turkish generals were highly receptive to the Western opinion and values, Greek 
colonels remained indifferent to pressures. I will conclude by stating that the difference 
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in attitude of the international actors had significant consequences with respect to 
further democratization processes in Turkey and Greece.  
 
Historical Backgrounds of Regime Breakdowns in Turkey and Greece 
The Turkish Case: 
Turkish democracy broke down with the military’s intervention in politics on 12 
September 1980. Major crises, leading to the coup d’état could be summed up under 
five sub-headings. First, prior to the coup political and ideological polarization and 
violence between the right and the left were at their height, causing high number of 
causalities on the streets from both sides. Second, in 1980, the Turkish National 
Assembly was unable to elect its new president to replace retired president Fahri 
Korutürk (1973-1980) even after 100 successive rounds of balloting. Third, the 
politicians were unable to comprise and cooperate not only on electing president but 
also virtually on almost all topics. It was because, as Harris (1988, p.192) puts it, they 
were more concerned with maintaining their deputies in party line (when 
parliamentarians change parties frequently), than providing effective administration and 
sound political judgments. Fourth, perhaps equally significant, Turkey was undergoing 
major economic crisis due to increase in oil prices and decreased demand for Turkish 
export goods in the international market. Finally, the National Salvation Party, which 
was represented in the Parliament with the 8 per cent of all seats was involved in certain 
activities which were perceived as anti-secularist by the military, such as not attending 
to August 30 Victory Day (30 Ağustos Zafer Bayramı) and keeping silent during the 
play of national anthem in a party gathering (Harris, 1988, p.192). 
Under this climate, in 1980, the Turkish military conducted the takeover with 
exceptional degree of professionalism and by preserving its unity. The takeover was 
well-planned by the Chief of General Staff in consultation with the field commanders. 
Even division of labor for special tasks among individual specialists was designated 
prior to the coup. Moreover, institutional design, constitutional principles, and 
mechanisms for use of executive power were determined before the coup was staged 
(Karpat, 1988, p.150). Finally, when it was 4.00 a.m. on September 12, the military 
announced that the Turkish Armed Forces seized power. 
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In reference to the above mentioned major crises, the Turkish military 
legitimized the coup on the grounds of civilian politicians’ inability to protect the 
country against internal and external threats due to ideological and political 
fragmentation, which marked the civilian politics throughout the 1970s (Evin, 1988, 
pp.203-204). In his first public speech following the coup, the Chief of General Staff, 
Kenan Evren, explained that the Turkish Armed Forces seized the power in order to 
“put democracy into its right track since it is unable to function on its own”3 (Ünlü, 
2005). Planning of the coup and its legitimization demonstrates that the Turkish military 
had perceived itself as the guardian of the state and national interest and that it had 
deeply distrusted civilians. In fact, the Chief of General Staff, Kenan Evren, in his 
speech following the coup, condemned “the politicians for their ineptitude and their 
disregard for the national interest” (Karpat, 1988, p.150). Now, the military was there in 
order to protect the national interest. 
The military, with the coup, aimed to accomplish four pre-designed tasks which 
they believed the civilians failed to accomplish: “firstly, to suppress terrorism; secondly, 
to restore economic growth and stability; thirdly, to introduce a new constitution and 
legal arrangements which, it was hoped, would prevent another lapse into anarchy; and, 
fourthly, to work out effective arrangements with the civilian politicians” (Hale, 1988, 
p.166). In order to carry out its tasks, military members of the National Security 
Council4 (NSC) took over the power. The Turkish Grand National Assembly was 
abolished while the major two political parties as well as others were dissolved a year 
after the coup due to their uncooperative attitude and speeches and activities, 
detrimental to the national interest, as it was put by the military officers. Martial law 
was declared, and retired admiral Bülent Ulusu became the prime minister. “Ulusu 
announced his cabinet on 21 September: it contained 27 members, of whom six were 
retired Generals and the remainder were neutral bureaucrats or academics” (Hale, 1988, 
p.168). The Cabinet was exclusively responsible to the NSC which held far-reaching 
power in its hands. Indeed, all the political posts were occupied by the members of the 
military. 
                                                            
3 My translation from Turkish. 
4 National Security Council was established following the 1960 coup with the article 
112 of the 1961 constitution, prepared by the military officers who were in power then. 
It was composed of the president of the Republic, prime minister, four field 
commanders, and the Chief of General Staff. 
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During its rule, the military was relatively more successful compared to the 
previous civilian governments in controlling the economic crisis and performed better 
with respect to macro economic variables. It established law and order again, reducing 
the number of causalities in the streets substantially. Accomplishing their third task, the 
military officers also prepared a new constitution. In 1981, a Consultative Assembly 
consisted of 160 members from different occupations and backgrounds drafted a new 
constitution. Following close scrutiny by the NSC, the constitution was put into 
referendum in 1982 together with the referendum on the succession of the Chief of 
General Staff to presidency. Both the constitution and presidency of Evren were 
approved by the Turkish public with more than 90 per cent of votes. In the same year, 
convinced that their task was accomplished, the Turkish generals announced a timetable 
for returning to democratic rule and the transition was completed by the November 
1983 democratic elections. These elections were held as scheduled albeit under 
substantial restrictions, which were imposed by the NSC on parties that ran in the 
elections and candidates that were proposed by those parties (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 
2009, p.1). 
 
The Greek Case: 
In Greece, the democratic regime broke down on 21 April 1967. The Greek 
colonels took over the government in order to exclude the newly-mobilized leftist forces 
from governmental power, and hence, to protect the interests of the extreme right 
against the leftist threat. During the 1960s, Greece was undergoing high level of 
economic growth and industrialization and concomitant to that, high levels of 
urbanization and expansion of the working class. Urbanization and newly-developed 
consciousness of the workers made the inequalities more visible in the social scene 
while found its reflection in the political arena, as well. George Papandreou came to 
power by gaining the support of those societal forces by promising greater equality and 
significant social and economic reforms. In fact, the Center Union of Papandreou was 
able to secure parliamentary majority over the rightist National Radical Union (ERE) in 
the November 1963 elections (Karakatsanis, 2001, pp.3-4). Under this climate, the right 
felt threatened by the left and suspected that it would conduct a communist revolution. 
The first prime minister of the junta regime, Kollias stated that the military takeover in 
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Greece was “not a revolution but a counter revolution… to prevent a communist 
revolution which was imminent” (Cited in Roufos, 1972, p.148). 
Similar to its Turkish counterpart, when it came to power, the Greek military 
banned all political parties and declared martial law. The press and media were silenced 
under heavy censorship rules during junta regime (Yannapoulos, 1972, p.164). Yet, 
despite the terror and harsh restrictions of the junta, opposition groups still developed. It 
goes without saying that the majority of these groups were organized by the leftist 
groups and some pro-democratic liberals. Indeed, the left got strengthened during the 
junta period to such an extent that Yannapoulos (1972, p.164) calls it as the new-
orientation of Greek politics. It might be seen as a result of Greek public discontent to 
the colonels’ regime. In fact, unlike its Turkish counterpart, the Greek military lacked 
legitimacy in public and the international scene during its seven years of rule (Verney & 
Couloumbis, 1991, p.107). On 17 November 1973, the protest of students of the Athens 
Polytechnic University against the junta regime was suppressed brutally, leaving 24 
civilian casualties, most of whom were university students. The event diminished 
internal and external legitimacy of the colonels even further. On 25 November, 
Ioannides overthrew Papadapoulos- former leader of the coup and the first president of 
the regime by accusing him of betraying the principles of the coup (Veremis, 1997, 
p.167). It can be seen as an attempt to renew legitimacy of the junta after November 17 
events in order to stay in power. 
Colonels, indeed, were solely motivated by their desire to remain in power. 
Contrary to the Turkish military, Greek junta in 1967 did not have any consistent 
ideology, plan, or even future vision for the country. They justified the coup on the 
grounds of leftist threat. Yet, once they came in power, their agenda seemed to be 
unclear. Soon after the coup, they adopted the vague rhetoric of “Hellenic-Christian 
civilization” implying that religious and nationalist sentiments would be dominant in the 
new polity (Veremis, 1997, p.159). In August 1967, the junta prepared its own 
constitution and put into referendum under the strict martial law rules. The constitution 
was approved with 92 per cent of votes by the Greek public. Indeed, the constitution 
seemed to be designed in order to justify the presence of military in power and to give 
extraordinary authority to the military members such as all ministries except for 
premiership, Constitutional Court membership, and the other key political posts. 
Besides significant political posts, seven years of rule was marked by clientalism and 
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nepotism for the military members who were below in the chain of command (Veremis, 
1997, p.163).  
Eventually, the colonels’ regime came to an end with the defeat of the Greek 
armed forces in the Cyprus war against the Turkish army in 1974 following the enosis 
attempt of the Greek Colonels. The Colonels planned a coup on the island against the 
President Makarios in order to integrate Cyprus to Greece. In response to this attempt, 
on 20 July 1974, the Turkish army started to deploy its armed forces on the island. 
Greek Colonels were so much divided politically and ideologically after seven years in 
political power and far from professionalism due to clientalistic and nepotistic behavior 
in rule that they could not react to the Turkish military campaign in Cyprus. Veremis 
(1997, p.167) explains that “…junta had either to declare war and risk the 
consequences, or back down and face public humiliation” and adds that “Unable or 
unwilling to choose the former, it preferred to step down in favor of the politicians”. As 
its incapability of protecting the country against an external threat was revealed; in the 
aftermath of the defeat, it was impossible for the Greek military to sustain its political 
position (Karakatsanis, 2001, p.157). On 23 July 1974, the junta period in Greece 
officially ended and Constantine Karamanlis who was the former prime minister of 
Greece and the leader of ERE was called back from his self-imposed exile in Paris to 
hold premiership.  
 
International Responses to Democratic Breakdowns in Turkey and Greece 
Diplomatic Isolation 
The European Community, Council of Europe, IMF, World Bank, United States, 
and several Western European countries were particularly effective in the transition 
periods in Turkey and in Greece. Some of them positively contributed to the process via 
threatening those countries with diplomatic isolation or via actual enforcement of that 
threat. For Greece, the situation can be seen as more immense, compared to Turkey, in 
terms of diplomatic sanctions. Xydis (1972, p.195) defines the extent of diplomatic 
isolation that Greek junta faced by stating that the country “…was put by Western 
European countries into a sort of quarantine or, at best, on probation”. The Council of 
Europe expelled Greece from membership on 12 December 1969 due to junta’s 
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undemocratic practices such as harsh censorship on media and human rights violations 
(Xydis, 1972, p. 195). In addition to Council of Europe, the European Community 
unilaterally froze its associational agreement with Greece which was signed in 1962. 
Moreover, “… the firm attitude of the Commission, supported by the continual pressure 
from the European Parliament, made it clear that no improvement in Greek-EC relations 
was to be expected while Greece remained under military rule” (Verney & Couloumbis, 
1991, p.109). Scandinavian countries such as Norway, Iceland, and Denmark, Benelux 
countries, and Germany, Canada and Italy problematized Greece’s participation in 
NATO due to democratic breakdown in the country. Those criticisms were countered by 
the United States by emphasizing the Cold War context and geostrategic position of 
Greece. The country preserved its position in NATO. It was, however, “a fact that 
Greece was morally and politically isolated from her natural friends and allies in 
Western Europe” (Xydis, 1972, p.198). One after another, Western European 
governments froze their diplomatic relations with Greece. Sweden, Norway, and 
Denmark closed their embassies in Athens and were represented solely by chargés 
d’affaires in Greece; whilst Greek ambassadors in those countries and in Belgium were 
called back. Germany refused to accredit a military officer as ambassador and retained 
the previous civil ambassador in Bonn (Xydis, 1972, p.198).  
 Diplomatic isolation and its damaged international image discomforted the 
Greek junta. With a futile attempt to recover its international image and to establish new 
alliances, it tried to improve its bilateral relations with some of the Arab and North 
African countries such as Egypt and Libya. Moreover, the Colonels’ regime attempted 
to have good relations with Eastern European countries and even with the Soviet Russia 
even though domestically the communists were pointed as the number one enemies of 
the state and the motherland (Xydis, 1972, pp.199-201). This demonstrates that the 
authoritarian regime was highly affected by diplomatic sanctions. Thus, it searched for 
remedies against its diplomatic isolation by attempting to ally with new states instead of 
those Western ones. 
 Furthermore, being discredited by the international institutions and the Western 
European governments put further constrains on the legitimacy of the junta at home. It 
shall be reminded that from the beginning the Colonels’ regime was not entertained 
with high level of legitimacy in the Greek public eye. Yannopoulos (1972, p.176) notes 
that there was a mass public demonstration against the regime and in favor of 
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democracy in George Papandreou’s funeral on 3 November 1968. The protest 
demonstrated the extent of the opposition to authoritarianism in Greece. However, 
foreign manifestations of hostility towards the regime arouse public discontent even 
further and encouraged it against the junta (Xydis, 1972, p.197). In addition to 
encouragement, foreign critique supported and fostered public resistance. The burden of 
legitimacy was doubled by internal and external pressure on the Greek junta, which are 
mutually-reinforcing and reducing the regime’s sustainability. 
Contrary to the Greek case, in Turkey, transition occurred on the backdrop of a 
different domestic political setting. The Turkish military, unlike its Greek counterpart, 
did not lose its political legitimacy when it was in power. This might be attributed to the 
relatively short seizure of power by the military and its rush in announcing the timetable 
for returning back to democracy just one year after the coup. Success of the military in 
the economic realm and restoring law and order in the country by successfully tackling 
with internal security problems of the country such as separatist and ideological terror 
incidents also contributed to the legitimacy of the authoritarian rule. Moreover, initial 
position of the military was in favor of re-establishing democracy following a short 
interim period. Western governments and international institutions were already assured 
of this intention prior to the coup (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2008, p.5- p.14). Hence, in 
international opinion, and in Turkish public opinion alike, the military was not 
perceived as an anti-democratic force, if not a pro-democratic one.  
Under this climate, initially, the European Commission and the European 
Council stated that they understood domestic strains in Turkey which were used to 
justify the coup by the Turkish military. They called upon the military to guide the 
country to democracy the soonest possible. Yet, it might be claimed that the European 
Parliament and the Council of Europe assumed a slightly more critical stance in its 
rhetoric compared to the Commission and the Council towards the military regime in 
Turkey. Contrary to those institutions, NATO and the United States emphasized 
strategic importance of Turkey as a crucial Western ally and evaded condemnation of 
the regime (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2008, pp. 32-36). Therefore, early on, Turkey did 
not experience diplomatic isolation as immense as Greece.  
In the beginning of 1981, the human rights situation in the country deteriorated. 
Arbitrary political arrestments were conducted and those detainees were kept very long 
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period of custody (45 days) without any charge by the martial law officers. Moreover, 
torture incidents under arrestment started to be reported. Suppression of the opposition 
turned harsher. Bülen Ecevit, prominent politician prior to the coup and an eminent 
opposition figure5 was arrested three times and served in jail because of his critical 
stance against the military regime. During junta period, 300.000 Turkish citizens 
demanded asylum due to political reasons from various European countries (Ünlü, 
2005). As the human right abuses accelerated and the Western European institutions and 
governments were informed about those abuses through refugees and the channels of 
media, the rhetoric of Council of Europe and the European Community was transformed 
into a more critical one. Concrete sanctions, such as diplomatic isolation and economic 
sanctioning, came into agenda (Gürsoy and Aydin-Düzgit, 2008, pp.37-38). Similar to 
the Greek case, the EC froze its aid to Turkey (Karaosmanoğlu, 1991, p. 162). 
Moreover, the rhetoric of the European institutions turned harsher as well. “The EU 
proved to be an extremely active and vocal source of criticism of the military regime…” 
after 1981 (Öniş, 1999, p.128). Council of Europe threatened the country with 
expulsion. Similar to the Greek case, this put an extra burden of legitimacy on the 
Turkish military regime, precipitating the military to announce the timetable for 
democratic transition (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2008; Öniş, 1999; Karaosmanoğlu, 
1991). 
With respect to the Turkish and Greek cases, it can be concluded that NATO 
adopted a more pragmatic stance towards the authoritarian regimes. This might stem 
from the fact that NATO has been first and foremost a collective security organization. 
From the beginning, democracy did not present a moral postulate for the organization. 
However, it can be speculated that if foreign policies of Turkish and Greek military 
regimes were to deviate from the alliance due to regime change, NATO’s initial 
reaction could have been different. Then (in 1983) the CIA president, Stanfield Turner, 
states that in the Cold War context, “we did not care if the one in charge was a good 
person. What was important was that it was our person” (Ünlü, 2005). 
                                                            
5 Bülent Ecevit was the leader of the Republican Peoples Party, one of the significant 
parliamentary groups together with the Justice Party and National Salvation Party prior 
to the coup. He voiced his criticisms of the military regime through a journal, he edited, 
called Arayış (Search). The journal was banned in May 1982. Bülent Ecevit was 
arrested in November 1982 due to the accusation of violating the decree, that prohibited 
the former politicians to express their opinion on political or legal system of Turkey 
(Hale, 1994, p.169). 
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In contrast to NATO, the European Community institutions were more 
supportive of democracy both in the Turkish and Greek regime breakdowns. The 
European Commission, as well as the European Parliament and the Council, 
emphasized the significance of a quick return to democracy. Nonetheless, their reaction 
to the Turkish and the Greek juntas were disparate. While harsher economic and 
political sanctions were put into effect against the Greek junta such as freezing of the 
association agreement with the country and expulsion from Council of Europe, they 
remained slightly more understanding towards the regime in Turkey6. This might be 
attributed to the initial justification and purpose of the coup in Turkey. Additionally, 
due to its self-declared duty of Westernizing and modernizing the country, Western 
allies of Turkey were convinced that the military would eventually guide the country to 
democracy. Yet, pro-democratic and critical stance of the European institutions and 
Western governments helped to speed the transition process up while encouraging the 
military officers to return back to democratic regime as soon as possible in Turkey. 
Compared to the Turkish case, political opinion of the European institutions and 
Western governments attempted to innervate democracy in Greece through a different 
tool- diplomatic isolation and external and internal de-legitimization.  
 
Economic Sanctions 
Political impact of the international actors on transition is compounded by their 
ability to impose economic conditionality. Since material benefits proved to be strong 
incentives for countries to conduct political change, through economic incentives, they 
are able to have more credible impact on the direction of the democratization. Fully-
aware of this fact, for instance, the European Community, following the regime break 
downs both in Greece and Turkey, suspended its economic aid, stemming from the 
association agreement of those countries. Especially, in Greek case, it had vital 
consequences. The junta was already passing through a disastrous economic crisis 
which was worsened by the suspension of the EC aid (Verney & Couloumbis, 1991, p. 
108). Moreover, “the EC was Greece’s main trading partner, in 1972 providing 47 per 
                                                            
6 Turkey already froze its Association Agreement with the European Community in 
1978, unilaterally. The difference between the responses of the Community to Turkish 
and Greek case can also be attributed to the fact that the EC lacked a tool in the Turkish 
case which it possessed in the Greek regime breakdown. 
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cent of its imports and taking over 48 per cent of its exports” (Verney & Couloumbis, 
1991, p.109). Hence, the suspension of economic relations between the EC and Greece 
had adverse economic consequences for the Greek junta. Deepened economic 
difficulties raised popular discontent which decreased the legitimacy of the regime even 
further. Together with contributing to de-legitimization of the military rule, the EC’s 
economic incentives played a crucial role in the decision of establishing democratic 
rule. As Huntington (1996, p.5) suggests following the transition “in Greece… the 
establishment of democracy was seen necessary to secure the economic benefits of EC 
membership…” In other words, the prospect of material benefits hoped to be gained 
through membership to the EC secured the necessary motive for the transition to 
democracy in Greece. 
  In the Turkish case, suspension of the EC aid was certainly undesirable from the 
military’s point of view. The EC, following the coup, blocked aid which was the 
extension of Fourth Financial Protocol (Dağı, 2001, p.24). Yet, since, the Turkish 
military regime lasted for a shorter period; it did not have equivalent consequences on 
the Turkish military. Moreover, the military rule in Turkey was an economic recovery 
period compared to the civilian rule prior to the coup. Hence, in connection with other 
domestic circumstances, the blocking of aid did not have the same effect that it did in 
Greece. Nevertheless, economic sanctions in the form of cutting the direct loans might 
have been conducive for the Turkish military to retract from power in a shorter period 
than it might have otherwise desired.  
 Although the European Community utilized economic sanctions in order to 
encourage democratization both in Greece and in Turkey, it is hard to claim the same 
for other Western institutions. For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank during the military regime did not suspend their aid to Turkey. The World 
Bank, in April 1981, endorsed a structural loan worth 304.5 million dollars, while the 
IMF sanctioned 75 million dollars in 1983 (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2008, p.24). Much 
more significant than those aids in quantity, the United States (US) provided economic 
and military aid to Turkey, worth 2.253 billion dollars during the military regime years 
(Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2008, p.23). Similarly, Yannopoulos (1972, p.174) names the 
United States as one of the “power basis of the regime” in Greece, effective in 
sustaining the colonels in power with the military, economic, and moral support it 
offered. Furthermore, some scholars speculate that the military takeover in Greece in 
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1967 was realized via the US support due its concerns about the leftist threat in the 
country (Verney & Couloumbis, 1991, p.106; Veremis, 1997, pp.155-156). Even if it is 
hard to detect if there was direct involvement of the United States in the regime 
breakdown, it is certain that it offered its support to the junta militarily and 
economically. Moreover, as a part of the moral support, “…American diplomats in 
Europe were actively- and unsuccessfully- lobbying against a condemnation of Greece 
by the Council of Europe” (Goldbloom, 1972, p.248) while American state officials 
were emphasizing significance of Greece for the Eastern Mediterranean flank of NATO 
(Yannapoulos, 1972, p.174). In Turkish case, as well, the American ministries paid 
frequent visits to Turkey and declared their understanding of internal situation in 
Turkey and importance of the country as a Western ally while relentlessly aiming to 
counter European criticisms towards Turkey by Council of Europe, the European 
Community institutions, and the Western governments (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2008, 
p.26). 
 Why did the United States, NATO, IMF and World Bank acted in support of the 
military regimes in Greece and in Turkey as opposed to the European institutions and 
European governments? For Greece, Yannopoulos (1972, p.174) explains that the US 
approached to regime question through its strategic and security concerns and adds that 
“the Colonels have proved completely docile: they never raised any problem concerning 
the use of bases and they even agreed… to the establishment of a nuclear submarine 
base in the Western Peloponnese”. It should be added that prior to the coup, an 
alternative government in Greece was the center-left who might have been harder to 
cooperate for American security objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean. For Turkey, 
Aydin-Düzgit and Gürsoy (2008, p.18) suggest that “a strong and stable Turkey was in 
the strategic interests of the US and NATO and Western officials were relieved when 
the Turkish military, which was pro-Western and pro-NATO seized power in 
September 1980”. An American National Security official claims that “The military 
takeover in Turkey was welcomed by the National Security officials. They said ‘Boys in 
Ankara did it’” (Ünlü, 2005). Moreover, the highest assurances of both Greek and 
Turkish officials concerning the commitment of their countries to NATO and to the 
friendship with the US were effective in the US’s particular attitude. Then (in 1983) the 
CIA president, Stanfield Turner states that “Maintaining good, friendly relations in the 
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context of the Cold War was more important” for the US “than human rights or the 
form of government” in an allied country (Ünlü, 2005).  
With respect to the divergence between the Europeans and Americans, Treholt 
(1972, pp.220-222) affirms that the Europeans were occupied with long-term 
considerations while Americans prioritized short term security benefits. Europeans were 
aware that cooperation and friendly relations with non-democracies were much harder 
to sustain in the long term. Furthermore, as the public opinion started to assert higher 
pressure on their governments in Western Europe, the option of standing favorable to 
the military regimes became unaffordable. Therefore, for the Greek and Turkish cases, 
we might contend that Americans acted in line with short-term strategic and pragmatic 
considerations while Europeans, under the pressure of public opinion, took a more long-
term oriented moral objection to the military regimes. 
 
Support for and Legitimization of the Opposition 
In addition to the demand for moral condemnation of the military regimes, 
public opinion pressure in Western Europe was concrete with regards to the protection 
of human rights under the military regimes both in Turkey and in Greece. The European 
Community as well as Council of Europe and some Western European countries paid 
particular attention to the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms during the 
authoritarian regime as well as throughout the transition period. For instance, on March 
1968, the Scandinavian countries brought a case in front of the European Commission 
of Human Rights and demanded expulsion of Greece from the Council of Europe due to 
extensive use of torture by the Greek junta (Treholt, 1972, p.214). In 1969, the country 
was expelled from the institution due to human rights abuses. 
 Even though the Council of Europe did not expel Turkey, it “…sent 
delegations…to undertake ‘fact finding missions’” in order to investigate human rights 
situation “and then report their findings to the Assembly in relation to Turkey’s 
membership” (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2008, p.44). As the human rights situation 
deteriorated in the country, possibility of expulsion came into agenda and was voiced by 
some officials of the institution. In addition to Council of Europe, the European 
Parliament presented a vocal point of criticism against human rights abuses, use of 
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torture, and restrictions on freedom of speech both in Turkey (Dağı, 2001, p.20) and in 
Greece during authoritarian rule.  
Sensitivity of the Western European governments and the European institutions 
with respect to human rights until the authoritarian regime collapsed in Greece helped 
the protection of the opposition from harassment by the authorities, aided transition to 
democracy by diminishing the legitimacy of power-holders, and by assuring the 
opening up of the regime.  For instance, the Colonels’ regime arrested some members of 
Democratic Greek Resistance Movement (DEKA) which aimed at overthrowing the 
existing regime in Greece and replacing it with a democratic one. Even though this 
group did not attempt to realize their aims by any violent action, the colonels were 
intolerant of any opinion against the regime. Yet, under the international pressure, the 
Greek colonels were forced to grant amnesty to some of those political detainees in 
December 1967 which assured the release of most of DEKA members (Yannopoulos, 
1972, p.179). In some cases, international pressure directly intervened in order to 
protect the opposition such as saving Alexander Panagoulis7 and Lady Fleming8 from 
death sentence. On 7 October 1971, some American intellectuals appealed to Greek 
authorities for not conducting capital punishment. International public opinion raised for 
both resistance members prevented junta from executing the sentence. 
In addition to protection of human rights during transition period, and perhaps 
more importantly, external sources provide legitimacy to the opposition, encouraging 
them against the existing regime and for the resumption of democracy. For instance, 
Mikis Theodarakis, a famous composer and a well-known figure of opposition as the 
Chairman of Patriotic Front (PAM), held a conference in Paris in April 1970, under the 
auspices of the French government, where he manifested his outline for the unification 
of the opposition. In July, in the same year, Greek intellectuals prepared a book called 
‘eighteen texts’, embracing short stories, poems and essays. External actors were quick 
to congratulate the book (Roufos, 1972, p. 159). Colonels’ regime hesitated to take any 
                                                            
7 Alexander Panagoulis attempted to assesinate George Papadapoulos, the leader of the 
Greek junta between the years 1967 and 1973 and had been charged with death sentence 
which was never conducted. 
 
8 Lady Fleming was Greek-born widow of Sir Alexander Fleming and a political activist 
in the resistance movement during the authoritarian rule in Greece and died on 27 
February 1986 as a PASOK deputy (New York Times, 1982). 
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action against those intellectuals in order not to harm its international image further. In 
addition to intellectual movements, certain other political opposition groups were 
established in several Western European countries and continued to oppose the regime 
from abroad, such as “Anexartiti Aristera (Independent Left- based in Italy, 
Revolutionary Socialist Groups (based in Paris and London), Revolutionary Greek 
Communist Party (based in Germany), International Greek Workers’ Movement 
(Trotskyite- based in London and Germany)” (Yannopoulos, 1972, pp.172- 173). 
Evidently, external actors were effective in legitimizing the opposition in 
Greece. Nevertheless, it is hard to claim that external actors entailed similar legitimacy 
to the Turkish opposition groups. Although, the Council of Europe, the European 
Community institutions were critical of the human rights violations in Turkey and their 
initial forgiving attitude towards the regime was altered by the human right abuses of 
the military authorities, such as, they did not directly contact with any opposition group, 
neither legitimized it. Aydin-Düzgit and Gürsoy (2008, p. 14-17) suggests that the 
Turkish military was already believed to be pro-democratic by the Western sources and 
the opposition to the junta consisted of radical left or right groups, which had resorted to 
terror prior to the coup. Therefore, there was no pro-democratic opposition to be 
supported by external forces in order to aid the transition to democracy in Turkey. The 
Greek case stands out disparate to the Turkish case in this respect. The Greek junta had 
no initial aim of democratizing the country while the opposition was firmly in favor of 
democracy. 
 
Fertilization of Democratic Culture 
Elite Socialization 
External actors might aid transition to democracy in a country by fertilizing 
and/or strengthening democratic culture. One component of fertilization of democratic 
culture is democratic socialization of elites. It is important to note that elite socialization 
refers to informing the domestic elites concerning the importance of democracy for the 
external actors and to reproducing this idea through interaction with those elites or 
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through the agency of media. Also, democratic culture is used strictly in relation to the 
vision and establishment of democracy in the country by the elites.9 
For the Greek and Turkish cases, democratic socialization under the influence of 
external actors occurred through different groups of domestic elites. For the Turkish 
case, it was the military whose commitment to democracy was riveted through its 
interaction with the West10. The Turkish military, starting from the late Ottoman period 
and during the Republican era, has been a modernizing and Westernizing force in 
Turkish politics. (Rustow, 1994; Hale, 1994; Karaosmanoğlu; 1994) The military’s 
commitment to the Western style government which implies institutionalization of 
minimum democratic requirements is one of the essential components of its 
Westernization bid. Inter alia, this commitment can be seen as a result of the increased 
interaction between the Western world and the Turkish military since the 19th century.  
In the Republican era, Western world have had flesh and bonds through the 
European Community and the Council of Europe for Turkey. The Turkish military, as a 
component of its ideological world view, prioritized Turkey’s relations with those 
institutions. Due to the self-declared role of the Turkish military for modernizing and 
Westernizing the country, the military members were highly receptive to the Western 
values and opinion.  Therefore, between the years 1980 to 1983, the Western opinion in 
favor of democracy was significant in quick voluntary retraction of the military. Öniş 
(1999, p.128) states that “…external pressures associated with the EU linkage have 
…been a variable considerable significance in limiting the durability and intensity of 
military rule in Turkey” and speculates that “…in the absence of direct and vocal EU 
pressure, the military regime would have installed itself and institutionalized its rule for 
a longer period before returning to democratic rule”. As a proof of what has been 
claimed by Öniş, for instance, Muhsin Batur, the Air Force Commander prior to the 
                                                            
9 For discussion concerning civic culture, see Almond and Verba (1980). Civic culture 
discussions, in a nut shell, refer to the assumed positive correlation between civic 
culture and stable democracy. In this chapter, by democratic culture, I do not refer to 
stability of democratic institutions but to the willingness of domestic elites in the 
country. 
 
10It should be kept in mind that in this thesis I analyzed only the official rhetoric of the 
members of the military and of the institution. Analysis on concrete actions of the 
Turkish Armed Forces might lead to different conclusion by different researchers.  
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coup, in response to a question regarding the possibility of a longer- lasting military 
regime in Turkey, stated that: 
 “The Western World cannot accept this sort of system and procedure. It is just not good 
enough to say ‘if they don’t accept it, then so be it’. If we give way (i.e. adopt the 
proposed plan) we’ll get support from the Eastern bloc and Red China, but that would be a 
disaster for Turkey” (Cited in Hale, 1988, p.162). 
Hence, the elite political socialization for a genuine commitment of avoiding a long-
lasting military rule and for establishing civilian government apace in Turkey has been 
realized, on the one hand, through the military elites’ long-lasting interaction with the 
Western world in general, with the EC and Council of Europe in particular. On the other 
hand, those institutions and the Western governments reproduced this effect through 
maintaining democratic values and informing the elites on the significance of them at 
the European level.  
Compared to the Turkish case, the Greek elites’ socialization occurred through a 
different mechanism. Firstly, it was the civilian elites rather than the military ones who 
were drawn into the ideal of democracy or consolidated their beliefs in democracy as a 
result of getting into contact with the European elites. For instance, Karamanlis had 
been living in Paris. Many other Greek political elites, such as C. Mitsotakis, A. 
Papandreou, M. Theodarakis, H. Vlachos, ex- King Constantine and M. Mercouri 
(Verney & Couloumbis, 1991, p.110) were in exile in Europe, too; and, like 
Karamanlis, had constant contact with the European elites. Greek political elites might 
be claimed to be inevitably affected by this connection on the virtue of democracy. 
Secondly, the very power holder of the regime, the Greek Colonels were not inclined to 
transform the regime into democracy unlike the Turkish military. Hence, it might be 
claimed that the European Community was effective in political socialization of civilian 
elites in Greece while in the Turkish case, it was the military itself. 
Media 
Although diverging in critical points, the Turkish and Greek authoritarian 
regimes, in the period of 1980-1983 and 1967-1974 had several common points. Both of 
them restricted freedom of speech harshly, implemented strict censorship rules on 
media and aimed to increase their own propaganda newspapers, television and radio 
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channels. During the authoritarian period, access of the opposition to media tools was 
restricted in both countries. Nevertheless, foreign broadcasting and newspapers turned 
to be effectively used by the opposition groups. Moreover, Western governments as 
well as Western institutions used the sources of media in order to voice their criticism 
concerning the existing regimes and their opinion on the virtue of democracy.  
In Turkey, during the authoritarian rule, the military adopted the rhetoric of 
‘state of siege’ and pointed at the pre-coup media as one of ‘betrayers’ who were 
responsible for provoking the political crisis in the country. Subsequently, the junta 
passed laws and amended the constitution’s clauses which were related to freedom of 
speech. Indeed, these restricted the exercise of the right to a great extent. Under these 
circumstances, the media was transformed and some of the newspapers turned towards 
mere commercial ventures. Yet, there were some, like Cumhuriyet which retained its 
political line, but they encountered severe intimidation by the military regime (Groc, 
1994, pp. 201- 203). Therefore, the use of media by the Turkish opposition remained 
limited. As a bold attempt, former prime minister, Bülent Ecevit returned to his early 
career of journalism, by editing the magazine Search (Arayış). However, Ecevit was 
removed from editorship on 2 June 1981, while the magazine, itself, was closed by the 
junta in March 1982 (Hale, 1988, p.169).  
Public opinion was informed about the criticisms directed to the Turkish military 
regime about the human rights violations by the Council of Europe and European 
Community institutions. For instance, the Turkish media covered closely the visit of 
Council of Europe rapporteur on a fact finding mission about human rights and 
democracy and informed the Turkish public about the Assembly’s opinion, stating that 
“only states, respecting democratic principles can maintain their membership of the 
Council of Europe” (Dağı, 1998, p.132). The critical stance of the European Parliament 
and the case which was brought by several Western European government such as 
France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in order to expel Turkey from 
the Council of Europe due to human rights violations were generally held by the 
Turkish as well as foreign press. Although there is no sufficient evidence to claim that 
this reduced the legitimacy of the military regime in Turkish public, publication of 
criticisms by the Western institutions in Turkish and foreign media put further pressure 
on the military to return to barracks and to leave the power to the civilian politicians. 
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In lieu of ‘state of siege’ rhetoric of the Turkish military, the Greek junta 
adopted the discourse of goodness of ‘state and motherland’. Strict censorship on media 
was justified on the grounds of protecting sacred interests of the Greek state and 
motherland. In a memorable speech, Colonel Ladas, the minister of order in the junta 
regime, declared that “Good art is that which is good for the Motherland. Bad art is that 
which is bad for the Motherland” (Cited in Roufos, 1972, p. 153). Evidently what is 
good or bad for the Motherland was decided by the Colonels’ regime. Under the strict 
inspection by the regime, Greek intellectuals and artists refused to publish their work 
during the early years of junta. Roufos (1972, p.136) names this as the ‘silent strike of 
the intellectuals’. Under this climate, foreign media was crucial in aiding the 
opposition’s voice to be heard. Even though there were stringent rules governing the 
Greek media, foreign newspapers such as Le Monde and the Guardian were in 
circulation and foreign broadcasting was allowed to relay. These foreign media 
channels were continuously publishing criticisms directed at the Junta by the Western 
institutions, foreign governments, and the opposition in exile. For instance, protest of 
George Seferis11  against the regime was circulated in the foreign newspapers and 
broadcasted in foreign channels, informing the Greek public about the opposition 
movement; and, hence, aiding the resistance movement by publicizing it. As discussed 
earlier, legitimization of the opposition and publicizing the criticisms directed at the 
junta regime reduced the sustainability of regime by diminishing its public legitimacy.  
 
Repercussions of Different International Contexts of Transition in Turkey and 
Greece 
International response to the Greek and Turkish military regimes differed 
fundamentally with respect to type and intensity of diplomatic isolation, economic 
sanctions, and gravity of human rights criticisms directed at the regime. Therefore, these 
two cases demonstrate that the international mechanism throughout transition to 
democracy may not necessarily work in the same way. Type of the authoritarian regime, 
nature of the transition, and foreign policy choices of the junta during authoritarian 
regime affect international reactions to the regime. The Turkish military’s pro-
                                                            
11 George Seferis was a Nobel Prize winner poet and career diplomat in Greek Foreign 
Service. He has become one of the symbols of the resistance against the Junta with his 
“memeorable statement of protest against the dictatorship” (Roufos, 1972, p.157). 
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democratic stance and justification of the coup by the economic and political crises was 
effective in producing lenient attitude by the international community. Moreover, the 
military’s rush in announcing the timetable for transition to democracy was another 
factor, which ensured the international actors that the military intended to return to 
democracy. However, the Greek colonels seized power for an indefinite period and 
attempted to stiffen its rule during the seven years of authoritarian regime. Indeed, 
ambition of colonels to remain in power exalted the degree of criticism and hostile 
attitude of the international actors towards the regime. 
The Greek regime collapsed due to the military defeat in Cyprus war against the 
Turkish armed forces, not due to above mentioned tools and mechanisms of 
international pressure. As Karakatsanis (2001, p.127) puts it, humiliating defeat in 
Cyprus discredited the existing Colonels’ regime and forced the junta to retract from 
power. Although it was the fact that internal factor pressured the colonels’ regime and 
forced it for liberalization as the evidence set forth, they did not bring the regime down, 
per se. On the other hand, in the Turkish case, all those mechanisms worked with less 
intensity. The international community did not pressure Turkish generals as much those 
Greek colonels. Economic sanctions were relatively less intense, while diplomatic 
isolation cannot be seen as equal to that of Greek junta. Yet, the result was voluntary 
disengagement of the Turkish military and many scholars point that one of the reasons 
was the international pressure which facilitated this quick delegation of power to 
civilians (Öniş, 1999; Dağı, 2001; Karaosmanoğlu, 1991; Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 
2009). 
Indeed, the Greek and Turkish cases stand very demonstrative in this sense. It 
might be claimed that contrary to the common belief in the literature, it is not the 
defined mechanisms and tools of the international actors which lead to successful 
collapse of the authoritarian regimes. Ironically, none of the two authoritarian regimes 
collapsed due to international pressure on the junta. As the Turkish case showed, even if 
those sanctions are implemented to a lesser degree the outcome could be voluntary 
disengagement of the military, while harsh sanctioning may not always lead to collapse 
of the regime as the Greek case demonstrated. Ultimately, interaction and relation 
between domestic actors and the international opinion determine the success of 
transition to democracy. That is to say, the Turkish Generals highly prioritized the 
Western opinion on the country’s regime and condemnation against junta and 
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encouragement for democratic regime were effective in quick retraction of the generals 
from power. Contrary to the Turkish case, the Greek colonels had already isolated  
themselves from the Western allies. Hence, they were not in a position to respond to 
those sanctions even if they were highly affected. To sum up, for the international 
community to influence transition in a positive direction, the very power-holders in the 
country with the authoritarian regime shall prioritize the international view and respond 
to it. 
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Greece 
 
Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
Diplomatic Isolation 
*Expelled from the Council of 
Europe 
*EC Association Agreement 
was frozen 
*Scandinavian countries, 
Germany, Canada, Italy and 
Benelux countries applied for 
expulsion from NATO 
*Sweden, Norway, Denmark 
closed their embassies in 
Athens 
*European Commission, 
European Parliament, Council 
of Ministers directed harsh 
criticism to the regime 
*Threatened to expelled from  
the Council of Europe 
*Threatened to  freeze up the 
Association Agreement 
*No application was made 
for expulsion from NATO 
 
*No country closed its 
embassy in Ankara due to 
regime breakdown 
*EC institutions expressed 
their grave concerns and 
called the generals for return 
to democracy quickly 
 
 
Economic Sanctions 
*EC aid was frozen 
immediately after the 
breakdown 
*IMF, World Bank, and the 
US aid was continued to be 
supplemented 
*OECD aid was blocked 
*The EC, first, threatened 
with freezing up its aid. After 
two years, the aid was 
blocked. 
*IMF, World Bank, and the 
US aid continued to be 
supplemented 
 
Support for and 
Legitimization of the 
Opposition 
*Support for the opposition 
groups (such as DEKA, PAM), 
individuals (such as 
Alexander Panagouli), and for 
intellectuals by Western 
governments 
*Protection of Clandestine 
opposition organizations in 
*No support or legitimization 
of the opposition except for 
Bülent Ecevit and 
condemnation of human 
rights violations of opposition 
groups 
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Table 1- Responses of the International Community to the Authoritarian Regimes in 
Turkey and Greece in 1983 and in 1974 respectively 
 
Different stances, adopted by international actors towards the Greek and Turkish 
authoritarian regimes (see Table 1) had further consequences. The Turkish military did 
not lose its legitimacy at home, partly, due to the lenient attitude of the international 
actors. Rather, it strengthened its role as the protector of democracy domestically- a role 
which was partially justified by the understanding rhetoric adopted by some 
international actors such as the European Commission. Kenan Evren, the Chief of 
General Staff during the military takeover and the first president of the post-junta 
period, claims that “Our allies (allies of Turkey) were happy that we (the Turkish 
military) took over”12. The Turkish generals were convinced that their attempt to “to put 
democracy into the right track” as Evren, himself, puts it, were welcomed by external 
forces, as well as the Turkish public (Ünlü, 2005). This stiffened the belief of the 
military as the guardian of the state. 
Preservation of legitimacy when it was in power allowed the Turkish military to 
assure institutional prerogatives for itself following the transition and those institutional 
guarantees were justified through the role of the Turkish military as the guardian of 
democracy in Turkey. Unlike the Turkish army, domestic legitimacy of the Greek 
                                                            
12 My translation from Turkish. 
different parts of Europe 
 
Fertilization of 
Democratic Culture 
a. Elite 
Socialization 
b. Foreign Media 
 
*Not the Colonels who but 
Karamanlis and other 
political elites in exile 
socialized into democratic 
ideas. 
*Foreign media was critical 
 
*The Turkish Military/ 
Generals favored Western 
type of government before 
the coup 
*Foreign media was critical 
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colonels, among other things, was weakened by the hostile attitude of the international 
actors which were harsher towards the junta, compared to the Turkish case. In order to 
deprive the junta of legitimacy, the international actors adopted a more critical and 
harsher rhetoric while imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions were imposed. 
Moreover, domestic opposition towards the regime was encouraged and fostered by the 
international forces. Hence, the Greek colonels unlike the Turkish counterpart could not 
preserve any institutional guarantees for themselves, following its retraction from 
power. 
Inter alia, those different attitudes, adopted by the international actors towards 
Turkish and Greek military regimes would have further consequences on democratic 
consolidation phases of those two countries. Preserved legitimacy of the Turkish 
military proved to be detrimental for consolidation, while the Greek military’s 
deprivation of legitimacy could be seen more conducive to democracy. Together with 
the impact of different attitudes that were adopted by the international actors during the 
authoritarian period, international context of democratic consolidation in Greece and in 
Turkey will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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II. International Factors and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey and 
Greece:  Convincing the National Elites to Democratize 
 Turkey and Greece successfully completed their transitions in 1983 and in 1975, 
respectively. In Turkey it was the military which voluntarily disengaged and opened the 
path of transition, while in Greece, Constantine Karamanlis and his party New 
Democracy guided the country to democracy. Now, their regimes would be faced with a 
new challenge. They had to gain support and compliance of all significantly political 
groups (including the ones who initiated the transition) with the democratic rules of the 
game. In other words, they had to consolidate their democracies.  
 
Defining Democratic Consolidation 
Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle (1995, p.3) contend that “…transition results 
in creation of a new regime; consolidation results in the stability and persistence of that 
regime…” In order to ensure persistence and stability, according to Linz and Stepan 
(1995, p.5), “democracy should be the only game in town” which means all the actors, 
groups, and institutions shall accept and internalize democratic rules. In line with Linz’s 
conclusions, according to Gunther et al (1995, p.3) democratic consolidation, as a 
concept, refers to a democratic system in which none of the politically significant 
groups challenge or attempt to challenge democracy with their actions; while, common 
consensus on acceptability and legitimacy of those institutions underlines domestic 
politics. In other words, politically significant groups, including masses, offer their 
behavioral compliance and attitudinal support for democratic establishment in a 
consolidated democracy (Gunther et al., 1995, p.3). 
Borrowing from Linz and Gunther et al., in this thesis, democratic consolidation 
will refer to the condition that all the rules and procedures of democracy are complied 
and seen as legitimate by all politically significant groups within the polity. 
Additionally, trust among the actors that the others also will be offering their genuine 
support for democracy will be referred as another feature of consolidated democracies. 
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Since, in the absence of trust, legitimacy of democratic institutions would diminish and 
actors would hesitate to play the democratic game13. 
With respect to this definition, in this thesis, Turkey will be classified as an 
unconsolidated democracy due to its failure to ensure attitudinal support and behavioral 
compliance of all politically significant groups in Turkish politics. It will be argued that 
reluctance of the military to fully submit to the democratic rules of the game due to its 
deep distrust to civilian politicians and the role of the military in domestic politics stand 
as an obstacle in front of consolidation in Turkey. On the other hand, as it is commonly 
acknowledged, Greece will be referred as a consolidated democracy since there is no 
significant group, actor or institution who challenges or attempt to undermine 
democratic establishment (Karakatsanis, 2001; Pridham, 1995; Linz, Stepan & Gunther, 
1995; Gunther, Puhle & Diamandouros, 1995). 
In this chapter, I will analyze the international context of consolidation processes 
of Greek and Turkish democracies. I will delve into the role of the external actors in 
encouraging democratic consolidation in the post-transition polities in Turkey and 
Greece. Firstly, I will argue that the failure of the international community to 
delegitimize the Turkish military during the transition period secured its place in 
domestic politics and proved to be detrimental to consolidation in the country. On the 
other hand, one of the factors, contributing to the Greek consolidation process was de-
legitimization of the Greek Armed Forces in the post-transition period. Secondly, I will 
discuss three mechanisms that encourage consolidation internationally with respect to 
the Turkish and Greek cases. Those three mechanisms are as follows: assuring the key 
elites that democracy will not harm their interests, elite socialization or legitimization of 
pro-democratic elites, and membership conditionality. I will conclude by arguing that 
among other mechanisms, providing credible guarantees to elites concerning protection 
of their interest in the post-transition period following transition is the most effective 
way of supporting consolidation internationally as the Greek and the Turkish cases 
demonstrate. 
 
International Legitimacy, Military, and Democratic Consolidation 
                                                            
13 Yaprak Gursoy, Pols 514: Politics of Southern Europe Lecture Notes. Istanbul: 
Sabancı University, 2009 
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Calvert (2002, pp.290-291) asserts that all militaries have the capability to 
intervene into civilian politics, yet they do not always hold disposition. In consolidated 
democracies, militaries do not pose threat of intervention. On the contrary, they submit 
to the authority of elected officials and legitimize the democratic system by offering 
their attitudinal support. To put it differently, unless the military accepts the legitimacy 
of democratic institutions, a significant actor would be defecting from democratic rules 
of the game and threat of intervention would prevent the democratic regime to 
consolidate.  
In the literature, particular transition path is commonly acknowledged to be 
related to the role of military in the post-transition polity and consolidation. On the 
relationship between further democratization and particular transition path to 
democracy, Agüero (1995, p.30) affirms that transition to democracy following 
voluntary disengagement of the military is not as conducive to democratic establishment 
as the regime transition by collapse. Moreover, military guidance to democracy, 
according to Agüero (1995, p.30), is not as encouraging for further democratization as 
civilian control of transition. Since, in case of voluntary retraction and military 
guidance, it is highly possible that the military will guarantee certain prerogatives for 
itself in domestic politics following the transition. (Agüero, 1995, p.31) Those 
prerogatives are expected to stand as obstacles to establishing civilian supremacy on the 
military in the further steps of democratization. 
As stated in the first chapter, the Turkish military retained its legitimacy at the 
end of the transition period, while the Greek army was completely delegitimized due to 
diplomatic and economic sanctions of the international community and due to its defeat 
in Cyprus war. At the end of the transition, the Greek colonels were convinced about 
detrimental consequences of the military regime and were not in a position to guide the 
transition (Karakatsanis, 2001, p.157). Instead, a civilian, Constantine Karamanlis, 
guided the transition to democracy in the country. On the other hand, the Turkish 
generals believed that the Western allies of the country as well as the Turkish public 
backed the coup d’état in 1980. Contrary to the Greek case, the Turkish military was not 
deprived of power but retracted voluntarily in 1983. Under this climate, it was able to 
guide the transition to democracy in the aftermath of its retraction (Gürsoy, 2009). 
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Verifying Agüero’s conclusions, the Turkish transition path proved to be less 
conducive to democratic establishment. At the end of the transition period, the Turkish 
military was able to secure massive institutional prerogatives for itself. Ergun Özbudun 
(2007, p.193) contends that 1982 constitution14 “provided strong ‘exit guarantees’ for 
the departing military, one of the most important of which is found in Article 118, 
regulating the National Security Council (NSC)”. In fact, with the 1982 constitution, the 
Turkish military increased the power of the NSC15 and thereby secured its place in 
domestic politics for the post-transition period (Gürsoy, 2009, pp. 27-28; Özbudun, 
2007, p.193). In addition to increased power of NSC, ability of the military to control 
post-transition politics was impressive. November 1983 elections were held under the 
strict control of the Turkish military. The former politicians were banned to stand as 
candidates in the elections as the provisional Article 4 of the Constitution urged. 
Additionally, via party law, NSC determined which parties could run for the elections, 
as well as holding the exclusive power of vetoing candidates and members of the 
newly-established political parties (Hale, 1988, p.170; Karpat, 1988, p.155). 
                                                            
14 1982 constitution was prepared by the National Security Council and came into force 
after being put into referandum in November 1982 . For furhter discussion on 
constitution-making process, see chapter 2. 
 
15 While the Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution states that “National Security Council 
submits to the Council of Ministers the necessary basic views in order to assist in taking 
decisions on national security and security coordination”, original Article 118 of the 
1982 Constitution reads as follows: “The National Security Council shall submit to the 
Council of Ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination 
with regard to the formulation, determination, and implementation of the national 
security policy of the State. The Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to 
the decisions of the National Security Council concerning measures that it deems 
necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the 
integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society.” 
Evidently, 1982 constitution put additional emphasis on competences of the NSC in 
formulating national security policies and concomitant to that, it increased the role of 
the military in Turkish politics. (Özbudun, 2007,p.193) 
In 2003, the article 118 of the constitution was amended so as to harmonize Turkish 
laws and rules with the EU as a part of democratization attempts. As amended, the 
article 118 reads as follows: “The National Security Council submits to the Council of 
Ministers its advisory decisions and its views on ensuring the necessary coordination 
with regard to the formulation, determination, and implementation of the national 
security policy of the state”. It can be concluded new version of the article 118 
emphasize advisory character of the NSC decisions and ‘priority consideration’ to be 
given by the Council of Ministers  to those decision is dropped. 
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The Greek transition, on the other hand, was marked by the ability of civilians to 
insert influence on the post-transition polity. Until the first post-junta elections, 
scheduled on 17 November 1974, Karamanlis issued amnesty to political prisoners and 
legalized the Communist Party. In December of 1974, with the popular vote of Greek 
public, the monarch was abolished (Karakatsanis, 2001, p.5). These were significant 
steps towards democratization and presented a major break with the authoritarian past. 
Since the Communist Party and communism were the number one enemies of the 
colonels and the monarchy was the symbol of extreme right prior to the coup. As the 
Greek regime was getting civilianized rapidly, it is hard to claim the same for post-
transition regime in Turkey. It was not until 1987 that the ban on the public speeches of 
former politicians was lifted and partial amnesty to detainees of DISK trial was issued 
(Dağı, 2001, p.23). 
On 17 November 1974, Greece held its first post-junta elections, unlike the 
Turkish case, without any restriction on participation of political parties and without 
military oversight. Nea Demokratia (New Democracy), Karamanlis’ brand-new party 
won 54.5 per cent of all votes and assumed office for the new electoral period. The 
echelon members of the Colonels’ regime were trialed and charged with death sentence 
which Karamanlis changed into life imprisonment later. Contrary to the Greek case, in 
Turkey, none of the military members affiliated with the coup was trialed. Also, in 
Greece, civilians drafted the constitution after transition. With his close advisers, 
Papakonstantinou, Stefanakis, and Tsatsos, Karamanlis, prepared the new constitution 
(Karakatsanis, 2001, pp.58-60). Finally, unlike the 1982 Constitution, 1975 Constitution 
of Greece did not envisage many institutional prerogatives for the military (Verney, 
1990, p.204). 
 
International Factors and Democratic Consolidation 
In addition to indirect impact of international response to regime breakdowns, 
international actors might be effective in encouraging democratic consolidation in a 
polity directly. In the literature, three interrelated mechanisms of encouraging 
consolidation externally are defined. First, international actors might assure key elite 
groups by providing credible guarantees that democratization will not harm their 
interests (Pevehouse, 2002, pp.525-530, Pridham, 1991, p.225). For instance, the 
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European Union might assure the business (economic) elites that their economic 
interests will be protected against the risk of command economy. This is particularly 
significant for countries where there is significant leftist threat (Pridham, 1991, p.225; 
Pevehouse, 2002, p.525). 
On the other side of the political spectrum, international institutions can assure 
socialist parties that their representation will not be hindered or that they will not be 
deprived of governmental power forcefully by extreme rightist groups. Once faced with 
a military coup, this is significant for the socialist parties to offer their attitudinal 
support for democracy and see the democratic game as legitimate. In this respect, 
theoretically, Council of Europe, the European Union (EU), and Organization of 
Security and Cooperation (OSCE) assure the leftist political groups on the sustainability 
of democratic institutions through their membership conditionality and by providing an 
extra-layer of protection to democratic institutions. Council of Europe, for instance, 
monitors the elections, human rights situation, and implementation of rule of law, and 
democracy in its member states, such as Russia, Georgia, and Turkey16. On the other 
hand, OSCE has the mission of promoting “democratic development, human rights, 
tolerance and non-discrimination, and rule of law”17 (OSCE, 2009) as well as mission of 
election observation. In theory, membership to those international institutions might 
assuage the fears of socialists concerning an overthrow of the democratic system. 
 In addition to socialist and economic elites, external actors might persuade the 
military elites that in case of their submission to civilian rule, their corporate interests 
will be protected. Pevehouse (2002, p.527) states that NATO, for instance, requires the 
allied countries to keep their military expenditures high. Therefore, NATO membership 
can be an extra guarantee for the protection of military corporate interests. Moreover, by 
providing collective security to its members, NATO might ensure the military elites that 
they do not need to step into politics due to an external threat. 
The second mechanism through which the international actors encourage 
democratization is elite socialization at home (Pridham, 1995, p.180). Under the general 
                                                            
16 Council of Europe monitoring reports can be accessed via official website of the 
institution: http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/monitoring_en.asp 
 
17 Further information on democratization activities of OSCE, one may refer to the 
official website of the institution: http://www.osce.org/odihr/ 
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heading of elite socialization, Pevehouse (2002, p.525) and McLaren (2008, p.235) 
emphasize socialization processes of military elites. They contend that engagement in 
intense contact with their colleagues in various collective security organizations might 
persuade domestic military elites on the role of the military as the security provider and 
help them to abandon their role in domestic politics. Pridham (1995, p.180), on the 
other hand, affirms that socialization of domestic political elites is equally significant. 
He argues that mechanics and tools of decision-making in the international institutions 
and integration of elites into this system will socialize them into the ideal and practice 
of democracy. Assuming their seats in various organs of those institutions would ensure 
domestic elites to undergo a process of elite political learning on democracy and 
democratic decision-making. 
Pridham’s explanation of elites drowning into an abstract ideal of democracy via 
engagement with international leaders, however, does not seem quite convincing. Since, 
it is more probable that domestic leaders are well-aware of democratic procedures and 
tools. Yet, prior to consolidation, they are reluctant to comply with those rules and 
legitimize them as ‘the only game in town’. In the process of elite socialization, there 
must be concrete reasons for elites to support democracy in relation to the international 
forces. To illustrate, elite socialization might occur when the elites are convinced that 
the only way of attaining international legitimacy is to be pro-democratic. Also the 
process that international institutions assure the elites that democratization will be in 
their interest can be referred as a learning process. 
Third mechanism could be named as conditionality of the international 
institutions (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p.159). By setting certain membership conditionality, 
international institutions such as Council of Europe, the European Union, the OSCE, 
and the OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) may 
encourage the states which are aspiring for membership to conduct democratization 
reforms. Through material benefits such as security and/or economic benefits, offered 
through membership, international actors might render their support for democracy 
more credible. Those material benefits might be used as a tool of sanctioning, in case of 
failure to comply, while they might be a reward when the actors adjust to democratic 
rules (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p.159, Öniş, 1999, p.121). 
53 
 
It is important to note that those three mechanisms are ultimately interrelated 
and mutually reinforcing. Elite socialization, for instance, might be fostered when the 
elites perceive their interest in democratization with the encouragement of external 
actors. Conditionality, on the other hand, might provide credibility to elite socialization 
and make the material benefits concrete that were promised while assuring the key elites 
about democratization. Moreover, conditionality can be seen as a tool more than a 
mechanism which fortifies the impact of the former two mechanisms on 
democratization. Indeed, the Turkish and Greek consolidation attempts are helpful to 
demonstrate the complex and interrelated mechanisms encouraging consolidation 
internationally. 
 
International Forces and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey and Greece 
Assuring Key Elite Groups 
a) Economic Elites 
In the post transition period, the European Community (EC) was effective in 
ensuring the Greek as well as Turkish economic elites that democratization would be in 
their interest albeit through different mechanisms.  As noted earlier, the Greek military 
took over the government against a serious leftist threat in the country in 1967. In the 
pre-coup period, communism and communist movements were remarkably strong in 
Greece and electoral victory of socialist parties was perceived as a threat to capitalist 
economy. Therefore, economic elites were highly hesitant to offer their attitudinal 
support for democratization. Nevertheless, the EC membership was effective in 
ensuring an extra layer of protection to the free market economy against those 
mobilized leftist sources. Economic integration and adoption of Acquis were seen as 
irrevocable guarantees for capitalist economy (Verney, 1990, p.206). Proving this point, 
“the Confederation of Greek Industries”, for instance, “was consistently in favor of EC 
membership as a security against radical economic policy changes associated with the 
rapid electoral rise of PASOK in the later 1970s” (Pridham, 1991, p.225). As those 
property-owners and business interest groups are acknowledged to be powerful 
domestic actors, their support for democratization is significant.  
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In Turkey, however, the argument that the EC membership was seen as a 
guarantee against socialist policies is not valid. Since, in Turkey, there has never been a 
strong organized leftist or communist movement, capable of challenging the regime, 
neither before nor after the transition. Yet, the business circles in Turkey such as 
TÜSİAD (Chamber of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen) too have been 
wholehearted supporters of the European Union membership of Turkey. For the Turkish 
case, it might be claimed that the EU membership is seen as the guarantor of economic 
liberalization and reduction in state intervention in the economy18. Economic aspect of 
the accession criteria compels the existence of functioning free market economy in 
Turkey. Hence, due to the prospects of increased trade and profit and as the guarantee 
against state intervention in the economy, Turkish property-owning conservative classes 
offered their support for the closer relations with the EC and hence, for the 
democratization. In fact, in a conference, conducted by Galatasaray University, then the 
president of TÜSİAD, Ömer Sabancı (2004) emphasized this point with the following 
words: “we observed that consolidation of free market economy in Turkey could be 
rendered possible only through a participatory and pluralist democratic political 
system”19 and referred frequently to European Union membership bid of Turkey for the 
achievement of such a political system. 
b) Socialist Parties 
In Greece, while the right was afraid of democratization due to the leftist threat, 
leftist forces were initially reluctant to accept democratic institutions as legitimate due 
to a coup possibility. In 1967, when the colonels took over the government, the leftist 
opposition forces supported democratization. Nevertheless, legitimacy of those 
institutions was diminished substantially with actual experiment of a military takeover. 
Moreover, Karamanlis, himself, was a former ERE (National Radical Union)20 member. 
                                                            
18 For further discussion on the statist policies and relations of Turkey with the EU, see 
Uğur (2004). 
19 Retrieved from 
http://www.tusiad.org/tusiad_cms.nsf/LHome/E87CB2C4972E63CEC2257353002E5C
26/$FILE/OmerSabanci27EkimAB.pdf (My translation from Turkish) 
 
20 ERE was a conservative right wing party, known to be supportive of monarchy and 
armed forces in the pre-coup period.  After the transition, instead of re-assuming 
presidency of ERE, Karamanlis founded Nea Democratia (New Democracy). The party 
placed itself in the center right and abandoned any extremist policies or rhetoric. Verney 
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Democratic institutions, established under the guidance of a former conservative 
politician did not initially invoke support for democracy among the leftist parties. In 
other words, at the end of the transition, leftist forces did not trust that democratic 
institutions would function orderly. 
The European Union was effective in ensuring PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist 
Party) and other political groups on the durability and sustainability of democratic 
institutions. According to Verney (1990, p.207), in the post-transition period, it was 
common to assume that “EC membership would lock Greece into particular institutional 
pattern, closely resembling that of the West European liberal democracies.” Moreover, 
Greek political actors largely held the belief that once the Western style democratic 
institutions are established, no major deviation either towards left or towards right 
would be expected thanks to the integration with the European Community (Verney, 
1990, p.208). It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss if this was realistic but what 
is significant is that it generated trust in democratic institutions in Greece. Indeed, at the 
beginning of 1980s, Andreas Papandreou changed his anti-system rhetoric and offered 
its support for democracy. However, for the Greek case, there is no concrete evidence, 
pointing that the Council of Europe and OSCE played the role of guarantor of 
democratic establishment. 
Contrary to the Greek case, there has never been a strong and institutionalized 
socialist movement in Turkey. Prior to the coup, there were some outlawed leftist 
groups which resorted to terror.  Nevertheless, they were unable to resist to the junta 
and insert influence by mobilizing civil society during the transition period. This can be 
attributed to the fact that their membership base was very restricted and they were 
ideologically divided among themselves (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2009, p.15). 
Moreover, restrictive nature of the 1982 Constitutions which put extra-ordinary 
limitations on associational autonomy and freedom of expression can be seen as 
detrimental to the leftist movement in the post-coup period. It can be assumed that 
democratization attempts would abolish those restrictions and broaden the fundamental 
rights. However, there is no sufficient evidence to claim that leftist forces in Turkey saw 
the international institutions as a guarantee for their political representation. It might be 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(1990, p.208) contends that choice of title for the party symbolizes Karamanlis’ 
willingness to identify his new party with democracy. 
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attributed to the fact that the leftist movement did not have any considerable organized 
impact during and after the transition. 
c) Military Elites 
Pevehouse (2002) and McLaren (2008) assume that membership to collective 
security organizations would guarantee that the corporate interest of the military will be 
protected. Hence, fear of the military will be assuaged and its behavioral compliance 
and attitudinal support for democratic establishment would be gained. Even though 
ensuring the military that democratization will not harm its interest is very important, it 
is hard to claim that the Turkish and Greek democratizations verify Pevehouse’s and 
McLaren’s conclusions.  
Greek Military: 
Greece became NATO member in 1952. In the Cold War context, NATO was 
the Western security organization to which Greece proved to be a loyal ally. However, 
following the transition, Greece withdrew from the military flank of NATO. Indeed, 
Greek policy-makers, including Karamanlis, himself, put the blame on the United States 
for tolerating the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and were doubtful of NATO’s 
ability to provide security to the country. The fact that NATO remained silent in case of 
aggressiveness by another NATO ally towards Greece raised huge doubts on the 
usefulness of NATO for the external security of the country (Veremis, 1991, p.71; 
Verney, 1990, p.206). Despite the absence of NATO anchor, at the end of the 
consolidation process, the Greek military was submitted to civilian supremacy and 
offered not only its behavioral compliance but also its attitudinal support (Karakatsanis, 
2001, p.5). This can be explained by careful dealing of the civilians with the military 
rather than external anchor. 
Following the collapse of the military regime, Karamanlis was always cautious 
towards the military and hesitant to harm its corporate interests. With this rationale, in 
the post-transition period, he kept judicial trial of the military officers, limited to those 
high ranking ones and kept the military spending high. Indeed, Featherstone (1990, 
p.184) notes that “Greece devoted the highest proportion of its GNP of any NATO 
member to military expenditure” in the aftermath of the transition. Karamanlis justified 
high level of military expenditure and his policies via the Turkish threat. Turkey was 
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believed to be threatening independence of the country. Hence, there was a need for 
strong military and high security expenditures (Karakatsanis, 2001, p.153). This 
strategy proved to be effective for consolidation of democracy. The Greek military was 
appeased by the civilians and was assigned the task of protecting the country against a 
prospective Turkish attack, while the military abandoned its political aspirations 
through the course of time.  
Similar to Karamanlis’ New Democracy, PASOK, too, when it was in office, 
was hesitant to harm corporate interests of the military and justified the constant high 
expenditure and the privileges granted to the military on the grounds of the Turkish 
threat (Karakatsanis, 2001, pp.164-167). Indeed, in spring 1987, when the leader of 
PASOK, Andreas Papandreou, threatened Turkey with war if it initiated mineral tests in 
Greek territorial waters, he, in reality, reassured civilian supremacy over military, while 
simultaneously appeasing the institution (Featherstone, 1990, p.184). To put it 
differently, he was demonstrating that it is the responsibility of the civilian leader to 
detect and determine security threats and declare war, if necessary. Simultaneously, he 
was reassuring the military on its significance for the national defense. In other words, 
international factors in the name of Turkish threat and the appeasing strategy of 
civilians were effective in consolidating democracy in Greece by helping to ease the 
military threat to the democratic establishment and clarifying division of labor between 
the military and civilians. However, it is hard to claim that membership to international 
security organizations played any role in this process. 
Turkish Military: 
Ironically, unlike its Greek counterpart, the Turkish military, during and after the 
transition period, have remained in NATO. Moreover, as it was discussed in the first 
chapter, during the military regime, good relations between NATO and Turkey were 
sustained. Nevertheless, high military expenditures, as the natural consequence of being 
a NATO member, were not sufficient to assure the Turkish military on forgoing its 
political role and hence on full democratization. This can be attributed to the specific 
domestic political pattern in Turkey. 
As referred in the first chapter, the Turkish military conducted the coup d’état in 
1980 due to its belief that democracy did not function properly. Moreover, in the eyes of 
the military, civilian politicians could not protect the country against external and 
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internal threats. In the aftermath of the transition, through the National Security 
Council, the Turkish generals have continued to determine security threats to the 
country. This led to the emergence of two-sided democratization problems for Turkish 
politics. First, even if the Turkish military might perceive itself as a democratizing 
force, it very presence in politics is an obstacle to full-democratization by definition. 
Second, the presence and weight of the military does not allow further democratization 
in Turkey. The military is highly sensitive on two topics, religious reactionism and 
separatism and continuously points them as the major threats to the Turkish state in the 
security agenda since 1980s (Cizre, 2008, p.139). Interestingly enough, democratic 
problems of the country are listed as fundamental restriction on freedom of speech, 
failure to ensure full protection to minority rights, and frequent party closures which are 
closely related to the areas where the military is highly sensitive (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, 
p.168). In addition, with a closer look, it can be detected that parties which were closed 
by the Constitutional Court between the years 1990 and 2000 could be grouped under 
two major political movements: Kurdish separatist movement and Islamic 
fundamentalism.  
The European Union has been highly critical on the role of the military in 
politics, restrictions on freedom of speech, failure to ensure extensive minority rights, 
and party closures in all the progress reports, issued since 1990s. However, it might be 
safe to claim that unless the international forces can provide the necessary guarantees to 
the Turkish military that territorial integrity and internal security of the country will be 
protected, it is hardly likely that the military will offer its full support for democracy 
even if it is strongly anchored to NATO or any other security organizations. Together 
with the credibility of the EU criticisms, this point on democratization will be discussed 
in the conditionality section.  
In sum, both the Turkish and Greek cases demonstrate that to assuage the fear of 
the military concerning democratization is of crucial importance. It is necessary to 
guarantee that democratic reforms will not challenge its interests. Nevertheless, the only 
interest of the military is not to keep the military expenditures high but is strictly 
defined in relation to domestic political dynamics as the Turkish case shows. 
Additionally, collective security organizations should have the credibility to assure the 
military against an external threat, as the Greek case demonstrates, in order to be able to 
encourage democratization. 
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Elite Socialization 
Greek Elites: 
As referred earlier, in the aftermath of the transition, PASOK and its leader 
Andreas Papandreou assumed an anti-system stance. The party denounced the 
democratic system for being another great power game on Greece. Verney (1990, 
p.209) notes that “Andreas Papandreou declared that he had founded PASOK not as a 
political party operating within a democratic polity, but as a national liberation 
movement struggling to free Greece from imperialist control”.  
Nevertheless, PASOK seemed to change its domestic and foreign policy line 
throughout the late 1970s and the beginning of 1980s.  Together with assurances 
granted by the international community on the durability and sustainability on 
democratic institutions, PASOK’s behavioral change can be explained through elite 
convergence model. According to Burton, Gunther, and Highley’s (1995, p.20) elite 
convergence model, during consolidation phase, firstly, those democratic elites win the 
elections and hold office while anti-system parties might be prevented from competing 
or be reluctant to compete in the elections. In the second stage, those anti-system parties 
would realize that the only way of holding power is the democratic game and would 
eventually adopt relatively more modest stance, compared to their initial agenda and 
would stop posing a threat to democracy. In Greece, initially, it was Karamanlis, who 
held the office for consequent terms and PASOK was left in oppositionuntil 1981. 
Nevertheless, the PASOK elites soon realized that they might hold power if they 
adopted a more moderate and truly democratic stance. In line with elite consensual 
unity rationale, “between the 1977 and 1981 elections, PASOK and its leader continued 
to move away from an initial image as a Marxism-based, class-oriented party” (Gallant, 
2001, p.209).  
International forces can foster elite consensual unity. International forces might 
support pro-democratic elites by legitimizing them at home and hence encourage the 
other group of elites to comply with the democratic rules of the game. In Greek 
democratic consolidation phase, Karamanlis was supported and legitimized by the 
United States and the European forces as pro-democratic elite which favored him in his 
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contest against Papandreou. This might be seen as one of the factors, encouraging 
Papandreou to be willing to play democratic game. Perhaps more important than that, 
towards the end of 1970s, PASOK abandoned its anti-EC and anti- NATO stance 
(Veremis, 1991, p.72). It new attitude contributed to its perception as a genuine 
democratic party by Greek voters. In other words, favorable stance of PASOK towards 
the EC and NATO baptized it as a pro-democratic force. 1981 elections resulted in 
PASOK’s victory with the 48.1% of all votes and 174 seats in the Parliament 
(Featherstone, 1990, p.181). Among other things, change in rhetoric of PASOK was 
effective in this electoral victory. However, together with its ambition to hold power 
and socialization of PASOK elites, guarantees that the democratic system would not 
favor the right or any other external power were equally significant in evoking 
attitudinal support of PASOK. 
Most scholars agree that Greece consolidated its democracy in 1985 with the 
second term of PASOK in office; when the party and its leader adopted a relatively 
more moderate rhetoric, compared to its initial stance such as leaving NATO (Veremis, 
1991, p.71). Additionally, the military offered its behavioral compliance with the 
democratic setting when the military accepted a socialist party in power without 
threatening to overthrow the government. There were still aborted coups in 1982 and 
1983. Yet, 1985 onwards, it might be said that all politically significant groups in 
Greece, including the Greek military and PASOK offered their behavioral compliance 
and attitudinal support for democracy. (Karakatsanis, 2001; Pridham, 1995; Linz, 
Stepan & Gunther, 1995; Gunther, Puhle & Diamandouros, 1995). 
 
Turkish Elites: 
In Turkish case, elite socialization can be evaluated as a more complicated 
phenomenon, compared to the Greek case. Both the military and political elites21 in 
                                                            
21 Evin (1988, p.213) contends that 1980 coup formed a new cleavage between state 
elites and political elites as an extension of the cleavage between state and government. 
This was caused by separation of realms of state and politics after the 1980 coup. This 
was the new formula, invented by the military to deal with civilians (Karpat, 1988, 
p.154). According to the formula, State would remain as a separate realm and would be 
represented by the President. Government and day-to-day politics would be endorsed to 
the elected civilians and as the 1982 constitution envisaged would be subject to tutelary 
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Turkey passed through elite socialization through different paths. The result of their 
socialization was contradictory in terms of consolidation of democracy in the country. 
First, as noted in the first chapter, historically, the Turkish military has been a 
modernizing and Westernizing source in Turkish politics since the late Ottoman 
periods. Socialization of Ottoman elites into the Western values and Western style of 
government initiated a well-established legacy among elites which continued in the 
Republican era, as well. During the Republican period, as a part of its self-declared role, 
the military has always been supportive of Western institutions. Ironically, 1980 coup 
was partly the result of this commitment. In 1980, the Turkish generals intervened into 
politics in order to “save democracy from itself”, as Harris (1988, p.1983) puts it. Since, 
for the members of the military, “…the enemies of democracy were politicians 
themselves…” (Evin, 1988, p.208). Its own ideological view and international pressure 
on the military would preclude a long-lasting authoritarian regime. However, the 
Turkish military was unable to fully commit to democracy due to its deep distrust for 
politicians. 
On the backdrop of omnipresence of the military in Turkish politics, Demirel 
(2003, p.17) contends that Turkish civilian elites adopted two distinct techniques to deal 
with the military: either, they attempt to establish civilian oversight over the military, 
or, they prefer inclusion of it in daily politics or even resort to the military on certain 
issues such as protection of secularism in public policy. Concerning the reasons for 
civilian demand for involvement of the military in politics, Demirel (2003, p.20) points 
to the weakness of the civilians and their involuntary acceptance of the omnipresence of 
the military in Turkish politics. Those who adopt the strategy of including the military 
or refraining from challenging its role in politics, in reality, aim at protecting their own 
interest in politics. 
Yet, there could be seen particular examples of civilians challenging the place of 
the military and attempt to submit it into civilian control. Turgut Özal (1983-1987), for 
instance, most possibly by depending on his electoral success and popular support, he 
enjoyed, conducted civilian overview of the military budget. This was a clear move to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
control of the state. (Evin, 1988, p. 27) In this chapter, it might be safe to refer the state 
elites as the members of military, since Evin (1988, p.213) contends that during 1980 
coup, state elites were solely represented by the military. 
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restrict the autonomy of the military. Moreover, Özal proposed to subordinate the 
military to the ministry of defense (Gürsoy, 2009, p.30; Demirel, 2003, p.8).  
The military, however, intervened into politics whenever it felt that the basic 
principles it defends such as secularism were under threat. On 28 February 1997, the 
military intervened into politics and forced the government to resign due to Islamic 
tendencies of the ruling party- Welfare Party22 (Heper & Güney, 2000, pp.640- 642). 
After 28 February intervention, on 27 April 2007, the Turkish Armed Forces issued a 
memorandum in the official website of the Chief of General Staff, in just couple of 
hours following the first round of presidential elections (Cizre, 2008, p.159). In the 
elections, former Foreign minister of the Justice and Development Party23 government, 
Abdullah Gül stood as the only candidate. Evidently, the military held suspicion on the 
commitment of the candidate to the principle of secularism and on the memorandum it 
was stated that “the Turkish Armed Forces maintains its firm determination to carry out 
its legally specified duties…. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces 
is a side in this debate and a staunch defender of secularism”. (Cited in Cizre, 2008, 
p.160)  
However, as a result of their socialization process, it is observable that Turkish 
civilian politicians have frequently resorted to the international ties of the country in 
order to undermine the role of the military in politics. Especially the European 
institutions constitute a focal point of attention for the civilians. It might be claimed that 
the European Community was thought to strengthen the civilians’ hands to conduct 
costly democratization reforms by providing a scapegoat for the civilian politicians. To 
put it differently, by utilizing the European Community link, civilians have calculated to 
pass laws restricting autonomy of the military and have aimed at establishing civilian 
supremacy over the armed forces without engaging in an overt conflict with the 
                                                            
22 Welfare Party was closed by the Constitutional Court on the grounds of contradicting 
with the secularist principles of the Republic as the Article 68, paragraph 4 of the 
Constitution urged (Heper & Güney, 2000, pp.640). 
 
23 Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) was founded in 2000, 
following the schisim between traditionalists and reformists in the pro-Islam Welfare 
Party which was dissolved by the Constituional Court on 16 January 1998 on the 
grounds of being a “centre of activies contrary to the principle of secularism”. Hence, 
reformists established Justice and Develoment Party while traditionalists are represented 
by Felicity (Fazilet) Party (Güney & Karatekelioğlu, 2005). 
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institution. This can also be attributed to the fact that the civilian elites started to see 
their interest in democratization in their struggle against the military. The support and 
legitimization of the domestic elites and heavy criticisms directed to the military by the 
European Union in this process stiffened belief of civilians in democracy and 
democratization. 
In sum, Turkish elite socialization, unlike the Greek case, does not possess clear 
cut example of the theory. In Turkey, both the military and civilians have been well 
aware that their legitimization to a large extent depends on their commitment to 
Western institutions and democratic establishment. Their socialization process, 
however, seems to contradict and present another challenge in front of democratization. 
The military is committed to Westernization of the country and accuse the politicians 
for not being democratic enough. On the other hand, civilians attempt to justify their 
position and power struggle with the military by democratization. However, they accuse 
the military for discouraging further democratization. It might be claimed that what is 
missing in the Turkish case is mutual trust that the other would comply with the rules of 
the democratic game. 
Another significant point is that even if the Justice and Development Party seem 
to be pro-EU, it fails to gain trust of the military on its commitment to democracy. 
Discussions if Justice and Development Party is a genuinely democratic party or has a 
hidden Islamic agenda fall beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet, it is evident that unlike 
PASOK, Justice and Development Party was unable to assure the other actors that it is 
not an anti- system party. In this respect, Güney and Tekelioğlu (2005, p.) contend that 
distrust of the military is not completely baseless. By pointing the historical evidence, 
they assert that civilian elites had a significant share in provoking the military to 
interfere in politics by their irresponsible behavior in the past. They, further, assert that 
as long as separatist tendencies and political Islam remain as the threats to the Turkish 
Republic, it is hardly conceivable to establish civilian supremacy over the military 
establishment and finalize Turkey’s democratic consolidation struggle. To put it 
differently, together with proved civilian ability of tackling with ethnic separatism, 
Justice and Development party convince the military on its commitment to democracy. 
However, it is evident that being pro-EU is not sufficient for the Turkish generals. 
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To conclude, the Greek case shows that even if in some cases, legitimization of 
pro-democratic forces and encouraging the anti-system parties to comply with the rule 
might work. International forces were highly effective in changing initial anti-system 
stance of PASOK. However, the Turkish case indicates that unless there is mutual trust 
among the groups, legitimization of pro-democratic forces may initiate a complicated 
process where actors put the blame of hedging and being detrimental to democratization 
on each other. This point clarifies the significance of assuring elites that democracy will 
not harm their interest. However, those assurances shall be supported by credible 
material benefits. The next section will discuss provision of those benefits and 
conditionality. 
 
Democratic Conditionality 
Membership conditionality seems to be one of the most effective tools in 
fostering democratization externally. In this respect, the European Union has been a 
significant actor in encouraging democratic consolidation in Turkey and Greece. First, 
both countries were aspiring for membership which multiplied the impact of the EU 
conditionality on those countries. (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p.159) Second, political and 
economic integration of the Union and its multiple tools have been effective in 
encouraging democratization.  Some of those tools can be counted as pre-accession aid, 
technical assistance and monitoring through annual progress reports24. Both countries 
have been willing to receive those material benefits, provided by the EU. Third, by 
institutionalization of its accession criteria, the EU has been able to foster 
democratization prior to the full membership. Indeed, the Copenhagen criteria25 
                                                            
24 Progress Report is a comprehensive document, annually issued by the European 
Commission. It delves into political and economic situation, setbacks and progress in 
terms of internalizing the Acquis Communautaire in the candidate countries. In this 
respect, it sets progress and challenges in terms of democratization in detail. 
25 Copenhagen criteria was declared in 1993 Copenhagen Summit and finalized in 1995 
Madrid Summit by the Council of Ministers and read as follows: “political criteria: 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of minorities; economic criteria: a functioning market 
economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces; the capacity to 
take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to political, economic and 
monetary objectives; creation of the conditions for integration through the adjustment of 
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determine the conditions that candidate countries have to comply with before their 
accession to the Union. The criteria envisage complete democratization and 
strengthening of democratic institutions such as guaranteeing submission of military to 
civilian control, protection of human rights and minority rights. 
Turkey and the EU conditionality: 
It might be safe to claim that the EU conditionality was effective in inducing 
democratization in Turkey through particular reward and sanctioning mechanisms. 
Moreover, the conditionality of the EU was credible since the country was aspiring for 
membership and mostly remained dedicated to the goal of accession after transition26. 
For instance, one of the priorities of the first post-transition governments was to 
reactivate the Association Agreement and normalize relations with the European 
Community. For this sake, Foreign Minister of the first Özal cabinet (1983-1987), 
Halefoğlu, paid a visit to the European Commission in January 1984 after few month 
following resumption of his office and asserted willingness of Turkey to improve its 
relations with the Community (Dağı, 2001, p.19). The response of the Community was 
to restate that normalization of relations is contingent upon the improvement of human 
rights records of the country and full democratization. Illustrating powerful impact of 
the EU conditionality on the country, Özal took immediate steps in this direction of 
democratization by lifting the ban on the public speeches of former politicians, 
declaring partial amnesty to detainees of DISK trial, and stopping the ratification of 
death sentences by the Parliament in order to normalize its relations with the EC (Dağı, 
2001, p.23). With the hope that its progress would be recognized, the Özal government 
applied for full membership to the community on 14 April 1987. The response of the 
European Commission was negative. However, in 1988, the relations between the EC 
and Turkey were resumed. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
administrative and institutional structures guaranteeing effective implementation of the 
acquis”. (See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm) 
26 Turkey applied to the European Community in 1959 and signed an associational 
agreement (Ankara agreement) in 1963. The Additional Protocol, expanding the area of 
cooperation came into force in 1971. However, the scope of this chapter is limited to the 
EU anchor after transition. For further discussion on the history of relations between 
Turkey and the EU, see Müftüler-Baç (2000). 
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It is observable that the criticisms directed at the Turkish government became 
harsher in the second half of the 1980s (Dağı, 2001, p. 23). In this period, Balfe report27 
which fiercely criticized the human right situation in Turkey raised resentment in 
Turkey. (Dağı, 2001, p.22; 164) However, as an attempt to better relations with the EC, 
in 1995, the Turkish Parliament passed a constitutional amendment package, extending 
associational rights, granting greater freedom to functioning of political parties, and 
allowing the university staff to be member to associations, in line with European 
expectations (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p.166). As a part of rewarding, in 1995, Turkey 
signed customs union agreement with the EC and was declared an official candidate in 
1999 in Helsinki summit. 
Although gradual progress in terms of democratization was induced by the EU 
in the post-transition period like 1987 and 1995 reforms, an impressive reform package 
was passed by the Turkish Parliament in July 2003 thanks to the EU conditionality. As 
mentioned earlier several times, the Turkish military has a well-established role in 
Turkish politics and enjoy high degree of autonomy. In 2003, the Justice and 
Development Party conducted substantial reforms in the direction of reducing the 
autonomy of the military and to cut its role in Turkish politics. The government 
amended the law on the NSC and the General Secretariat of the NSC in order to 
harmonize Turkish rules and laws with the European Union. The package turned the 
National Security Council into a mere advisory body, diminishing its executive power, 
and reduced the frequency of meetings of the Council from monthly to once in two 
months. Additionally, the number of civilian members was increased so as to 
outnumber the military members. The authority of the Secretary-General was cut to a 
great extent while the possibility of electing a civilian member to the post was increased 
by the amendments (Cizre, 2008, p.137). 
Moreover, the additional reforms, which were conducted during 2002 and 2003, 
extended freedom of expression and lifted the ban on education and broadcasting in 
Kurdish language. Those reforms in the area of minority rights were unthinkable before 
                                                            
27 Balfe Report was issued in 1985 by the European Parliament on the human rights 
situation in Turkey and “arrived at the conclusion that Turkey’s human rights practice 
was still far from ‘complying with the most elementary standards’ and recommended a 
further suspension of the setting up of a Turkey-Community Joint Parliamentary 
Committee (Dağı, 2001, p.22). 
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2002 due to military veto28. The Progress Reports of 2003 and 2004 acknowledged the 
progress Turkey conducted on the road of consolidating its democracy and encouraged 
civilians for further involvement in preparing National Security Strategy (Cizre, 2008, 
p.139). However, in addition to acknowledgment of progress, Turkish government was 
rushing to open negotiations with the European Union. As reward for the reforms 
conducted, negotiations between Turkey and the Union were started in October 2005. 
In addition to the rewards, in the process of consolidation, the EU has sometimes 
used the mechanism of sanctioning as well. For instance, in rhetoric, criticisms, directed 
to the regime by the European Parliament were harsh during the second half of the 
1980s. The resolutions of the European Union, issued in this period, emphasized human 
rights abuses, such as use of torture, trials in the military courts, and restrictions on 
freedom of expression (Dağı, 2001, p.20). In contradiction to its relatively lenient 
attitude towards the military regime, the European Commission, as well, seemed to 
disfavor the prospect of full membership and adopted a critical stance towards the 
democratic deficiencies of the country (Dağı, 2001, p.20). In addition to rhetoric, the 
Community institutions adopted some economic sanctions as well in order to induce 
democratization. For instance, in 1996, the European Parliament froze all financial aid 
to Turkey, except for the aid to be used in promotion of democratization due to the 
failure to improve the human rights situation in the country (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, 
p.165).  
Although it is evident that the conditionality and anchor of the EU encouraged 
reforms for further democratization in Turkey, it might be claimed that sanctions 
imposed on civilian governments had some adverse effects due to particular civil 
military relations in the country. As noted earlier, the military present an obvious 
challenge to democratization with its presence in politics and with its veto on the 
conduct of some reforms. In their power struggle with the military, some Turkish 
political elites have frequently resorted to the international ties of the country in order to 
hinder the role of the military in politics. It might be fair to claim that, the European 
institutions could not grasp the sensitivity of the position of the civilian government in 
many sanctioning cases. As Dağı (2001, p.19-20) suggests, the civilian government was 
willing to improve the human rights situations in Turkey. However, in the existing 
                                                            
28 See the first section on assuring key elite groups, Turkish military. 
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balance of power with the military, it was unable to do so. Imposing further sanctions 
on Turkey led to the weakening of the government, and hence democratization attempts. 
In other words, the Europeans strategy of sanctioning in order to put pressure for 
improvement backfired in certain cases. 
Another crucial point that the Turkish case illustrated was the necessity of full 
membership or credible prospect of it in order conditionality to be effective on 
democratization. Öniş (1999, p.131) states that reforms required for integration are very 
costly for the domestic governments. Unless, there is credible prospect of membership, 
cost of reforms exceeds the benefits. In the Turkish case, the ability of the government 
to challenge the place and significance of the military in Turkish politics as well as 
conducting other democratization reforms such as in the field of minority rights or 
freedom of expression, to a large extent depended on this prospect.  
Membership prospect of Turkey remains blurred. There are three points of 
discussions with respect to Turkey’s membership. First, many scholars and some 
European politicians contend that European integration depends on common European 
identity which is not compatible with the identity and culture of Turkey29. Furthermore, 
they point that due to its predominantly Muslim population and Ottoman legacy, Turkey 
is the historical ‘other’ of the European Union which render integration of the country 
impossible (Verney, 2007, p.309). This discussion implies that there are criteria beyond 
those defined in Copenhagen in 1993. This reduces credibility of the EU conditionality 
substantially. Second, opposition of some member states such as France, Austria, and 
Germany to membership of Turkey have continued to discourage the Turkish 
government in conducting necessary democratization reforms. (Patton, 2007, p.345) 
Since, accession of a new country is decided unanimously in the Council of Ministers, 
no vote of any member state would hinder membership of Turkey. In addition, those 
countries have offered special relationship, falling short of membership between Turkey 
and the EU which deteriorated the relations even further.  Third, additional criteria of 
absorption capacity30 of the Union played a significant role in diminishing early 
                                                            
29 For further discussion on Europeanness of Turkey, see Müftüler-Baç (2008) and 
Stivachtis (2008). 
30 Absorption capacity refers to the ability of the EU to integrate new members. As the 
European Commission puts it in order to enlarge further  the EU “needs to ensure that 
its institutions and decision-making processes remain effective and accountable; it 
needs to be in a position, as it enlarges, to continue developing and implementing 
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euphoria about democratization reforms in Turkey. In gives the impression that as 
Turkey approximates to fulfill the accession criteria, new ones will be added. In fact, 
Müftüler-Baç (2008) explains that “Turkey perceives that the EU is using a double 
standard towards its accession” and adds that “The view from Ankara is that the EU is 
not sincere in its policy towards Turkish accession and presents Turkey with unfeasible 
demands that go beyond the EU’s Copenhagen criteria and its Acquis”. We can 
conclude that conditionality is one of the most significant tools that the external actors 
possess. However, for it to remain effective, it shall be used in accordance with the 
preset criteria and by assuring that once the conditions are fulfilled material benefits 
will follow.   
Those setbacks led to the emergence of what some scholars calls reform fatigue 
in the Justice and Development party government in the aftermath of 2005 (Patton, 
2007). It implies that after impressive democratization reforms in 2002 and 2003, new 
reforms have not been conducted. Cizre (2008, p.156) prefers to call it the “fall of the 
EU project” and contends that it created a snowball effect after 2005, weakening the 
hands of civilians vis-à-vis the military establishment and led to relapse into 
traditionalist-nationalist line in domestic politics of the country. Civilians were trying to 
utilize the EU linkage for democratization. Lack of credible promises led to the 
weakening of civilian elites and concomitantly reduced their commitment to 
democratization. In other words, the European forces, particularly the European Union, 
failed to apprehend the significance of credible EU membership prospect in upsetting 
the current balance of power between the military and civilians and could not preclude a 
democratic reversal in terms of civil military relations.  
In addition to failure of the EU to grand credible prospect of membership to 
Turkey, the Turkish military was another factor which slowed down the reform process 
and contributed the so-called reform fatigue of the Justice and Development Party. It 
can be claimed that due to 2003 reform package, the military felt that its institutional 
prerogatives and its associational autonomy it enjoys currently were under threat. 
Hence, the military started to insert more pressure on the government and impose its 
weight in politics. (Patton, 2007, p.353) Nevertheless, many scholars acknowledge that 
                                                                                                                                                                              
common policies in all areas; and it needs to be in a position to continue financing its 
policies in a sustainable manner” (European Commission, 2009). Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/index_en.htm. 
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- as it was already mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis- the Turkish military has 
historically been a Westernizing and modernizing source in Turkish politics (Evin, 
1988: Hale, 1988; Müftüler-Baç, 2000, Harris, 1988, Güney and Tekelioğlu, 2005; 
Heper and Güney, 2000). The European Union membership is usually pointed as the 
ultimate realization of this century old goal of Westernizing Turkey. Therefore, why 
shall the Turkish military resist to a process, leading to its self-declared mission?  
Indeed, the Turkish military does not oppose to the EU membership of Turkey. 
On the contrary, it has offered its full support for membership bid of Turkey since the 
application of Turkey to the European Community in 1959. In fact, “the Office of the 
Chief of General Staff established an EU working Group in early 2000 to plan the 
military’s actions during the harmonization process with the EU” (Güney and 
Tekelioğlu, 2005, p.453). Nevertheless, the EU working group under the Chief of 
General Staff points an additional fact besides the support of the military for the EU 
membership. As the newly-established working group, raison d’être of the 1983 coup 
and the transition process have proved, the military deeply distrusts the civilian 
politicians. Hence, it might resent or even resist to the reforms, conducted by the 
civilian governments in this respect if it decides that ultimate interests of the Turkish 
Republic are at stake even if those reforms are conducted in order to harmonize the 
country with the EU laws. To put it differently, the Turkish military wants Turkey to be 
a democratic, Westernized, and modern country; yet, it mostly suspects that civilians 
have the capability of protecting the country against internal and external threats. 
Therefore, this lack of trust stands as the main obstacle in front of democratization 
reforms. 
Although, explaining specific domestic patterns of Turkish politics and civilian 
behavior is not the main focus of this thesis, inter alia, it might be said that absence of 
credible support to the civilian elites contribute to the contradictory behavior of them 
vis-à-vis the military establishment. Deterioration of the earlier commitment of Justice 
and Development Party to the democratization reforms and the EU membership can be 
seen as an illustration of this point. Also, later reform fatigue and retraction from 
reforms demonstrate that democratic consolidation attempt continues to be an irregular 
struggle between civil and military establishments. While the civilians, actively have 
sought for international support and utilized those links, failure to grand power to the 
former through credible promises, weakened the process.  
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Greece and the EC Conditionality: 
Contrary to the Turkish case, the EC provided credible promises to Greece on 
the road to democracy. Greece formally submitted its full membership application right 
after transition to democracy in September 1975 and was declared official candidate on 
February 1976 while concluding its accession negotiations in 1979 and acceding into 
the Community in January 198131 (Verney, 2007, p.310). Being integrated into the 
Community promptly, on the contrary to the Turkish case, the European Community 
might be claimed to play an encouraging role for consolidation of Greek democracy. In 
fact, most scholars agree that the most striking impact of the EC setting on 
democratization proved to be strengthening of fragile democracies (Pridham, 1991, 
Öniş, 1999, Dağı, 2001). As the Southern European democracies such as Spain, 
Portugal, and particularly Greece during 1970s and 1980s demonstrated the EC 
integration might provide the necessary political and economic anchor for further 
democratization on the long path of democratic consolidation while preventing any 
reversals (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p.166). Öniş (1999, p.121) states that the immense 
economic benefits, in addition to security and stability benefits, provided by the EC, 
renders “any democratic reversal, which would naturally lead to loss of those benefits… 
inconceivable”. The EC provides those incentives either through the full membership to 
the Community or the credible prospect of it. Öniş (1999, p.121) states that: 
The prospect of full membership during the first stage, followed by a graduation 
to full membership itself after a period of transition and adjustment, creates a 
vicious circle, whereby economic and political factors interact to produce a 
durable democracy over a comparatively short period of time. 
In line with Öniş’s conclusions, security, economic, and stability benefits that 
the EC provided were significant in consolidation of Greek democracy. In the 
immediate post-transition period, external relations of Greece were to a large extent was 
restrained due to diplomatic isolation, imposed by the international community on the 
Colonels’ regime. The country was highly dependent on the United States and had few 
options of diversifying its balancing strategies due to deprivation of membership of the 
                                                            
31 Similar to the Turkish case, Greece applied for Community membership in 1959 and 
signed an association agreement (Athens Agreement) with the EC in 1962. However, 
the pre-transition relations between the EC and Greece falls beyond the scope of this 
thesis. For further discussion on and comparison between the relations between Greece 
and the EC and Turkey-Eu relations, see Verney (2008). 
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international institutions such as Council of Europe and restrained relations with the 
European governments. In 1975, when Karamanlis was applying for full membership to 
the Community, one of his motives was to reduce dependency of the country on the 
USA and other powers by “introducing a Western filter between Greece and the rest of 
the world” (Verney & Coloumbis, 1991, p.118). Indeed, Greek policy-makers, 
including Karamanlis, himself, were highly resentful to the US for supporting the 
authoritarian regime and due to its silence in Cyprus war (Verney, 1990, p.208). Under 
this climate, the European Community membership seemed the most viable option, 
fostering commitment of Karamanlis and other policy-makers to conduct the necessary 
reforms in the country for further democratization- a precondition for full membership 
to the Community. Once Greece conducted the necessary reforms, the country enjoyed 
those security benefits and increased it soft power via being integrated to the 
Community. 
Furthermore, the European Community was particularly effective in stiffening 
stability domestically during the consolidation phase in Greece. Pridham (1991, pp.225) 
suggests that the European Community membership is usually seen as a guarantee 
against the possibility of command economy by the leftist forces. The EC guarantee 
might be claimed to ease the tension between the property-owning classes and leftist 
groups. Already, when PASOK rouse to power following 1985 elections, there was no 
active attempt of undermining PASOK government by either the military or economic 
elites. This can party be attributed to extra-layer of guarantee, granted to the free market 
economy by the European Community membership.  
Secondly, thanks to the EC membership, Greek government was able to conduct 
costly political and economic reforms without generating any significant popular 
discontent during consolidation phase, which actively contributed to the domestic 
stability in the country. For instance, Pridham (1995, p.186) notes the stringent 
conditions, imposed on Greek government by the EC in order to reduce inflation rate. 
Those conditions required expansion of tax base of the government, reduction in the 
number of public employees, and government borrowing. Those heavy economic 
precautions did not lead any remarkable public unrest. Since, it was seen as a part of the 
EC integration process by the Greek people.  
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Thirdly, following its accession to the European Community, Greece was 
endorsed with generous EC structural funds in addition to receiving loans designed for 
‘Mediterranean Europe’ and agricultural subsidies (Pridham, 1995, p.184). Those direct 
loans stimulated investment and subsequently further economic growth in the country. 
Apostolides (1992, p.87) notes that while current revenue of the Greek economy was 
590.8 in 1981, it was 823.5 in 1982, a significant part of which arrived through EC 
funds. By the time of its entry, the smallest economy of the Community, those loans 
were quite appealing for Greece. Moreover, in addition to stimulating economic boom 
and bust, Karabelias (1999, p.78) suggests that “massive inflow of EC funds into 
Greece from 1980 to 1995 appeared to benefit significant parts of the social strata”, thus 
further contributing to social stability and support for democratic institutions in Greece. 
In conclusion, the European Community’s impact on the strengthening fragile Greek 
democracy cannot be neglected. It provided economic, security, and stability benefits 
which rendered a democratic reversal impossible while increasing commitment to 
democracy among various societal groups. 
The most striking difference in terms of EU conditionality in Turkish and Greek 
democratization cases was the absence of credible material benefits to the Turkish state 
whereas Greece was promptly integrated into the Community and received the material 
benefits of membership. In relation to other factors such as the rift and lack of trust 
between civilians and the military, lack of credible promises and failure to grant 
material benefits reduced the impact of the EU conditionality on the democratization 
process of Turkey. 
 
Conclusion 
The international actors were highly effective in different outcomes of 
democratization processes in Turkey and Greece. Firstly, relatively lenient attitude of 
international actors during the transition period contributed to post-transition legitimacy 
of the military, via which it secured institutional prerogatives for itself and continued to 
influence politics. It might be claimed that this hindered democratization attempts in 
Turkey in consolidation phase to a large extent. The international community- although 
it cannot be seen as monolithic, in general- was much harsher towards the Greek junta 
which actively reduced regime sustainability and legitimacy of the military. 
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Consequently, the Greek military was not able to secure any tutelary control in politics 
for itself, following the transition.  
In addition to de-legitimization of the outgoing military regime, in the literature 
it is commonly referred that the international actors might encourage democracy 
through three mechanisms: ensuring the key elites that democratization will be in their 
interest, elite socialization in favor of democracy, and membership conditionality. In 
this chapter I contended that international actors were effective in ensuring Greek and 
Turkish business elites in addition to Greek socialist parties on democratization. 
However, it is hard to claim the same for military elites. Indeed, ironically, the Turkish 
military is feeling more threatened by democracy even if it is much more integrated to 
the international system compared to the Greek military at the time of transition. 
The fear of the Turkish military on democratization can be explained by deep 
distrust of the military for civilian politicians and Kurdish separatism and Islamic 
reactionism in the country. Contrary to the elite socialization theory in the literature, 
socialization of the Turkish military convinced the institution that it was the only 
guardian and the protector of Western type of government. On the other hand, 
socialization of some political elites pointed that they might gain legitimization and 
might challenge the position of the military by resorting to the international ties of the 
country. In this respect, they have supported democratization of the country rigorously. 
While a contradictory process of elite socialization unfolded in Turkey, the process 
seemed to be more orderly in Greece. Attitudinal support and behavioral compliance of 
PASOK was generated through the socialization of the party elites. PASOK elites 
recognized that in case that they gain legitimization of the international institutions by 
adopting democratic rhetoric such as the EC and NATO, they can hold power. In fact, 
together with elite socialization, assurance granted to PASOK by the international 
actors on sustainability of the democratic institutions was effective in generating 
support for democracy. 
Finally, different attitude of the EU in terms of conditionality in two cases was 
significant for democratization attempts of Greece and Turkey. Although the Union 
applied both reward and sanctioning mechanism as an extension of its conditionality, it 
failed to grasp the particular civil military relations dynamics in Turkey. While 
civilians, relentlessly, attempted to utilize the external ties of the country which are seen 
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as pro-democratic by the government, by harshening its critical stance on the grounds of 
human rights abuses against the government, Europeans could not strengthen the hand 
of civilians vis-à-vis the military establishment.  
On the other hand, Greece was integrated to the European Community and 
became full member in 1981. Membership to the Community was considerably 
effective in consolidating democracy. Since the economic, security, and stability 
benefits, provided by the European Community rendered a democratic reversal 
impossible in Greece. However, in the Turkish case, full membership prospect was 
never clear which led to the inability of civilians to conduct costly-democratization 
reforms which would undermine the autonomy of the military and ensure its behavioral 
compliance with democratic institutions. 
To sum up, the Greek and Turkish consolidation cases were illustrative in terms 
of apprehending the significance and the role of international actors in democratization. 
They demonstrated certain theoretical and practical conclusions on this impact. 
Together with transition to democracy, conclusions, derived from the Turkish and 
Greek democratization cases, will be discussed in the final chapter. 
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IV. Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis, I attempted to investigate international context of democratization 
with respect to its tools, mechanisms, scope, and limits via Turkish and Greek 
democratization cases in 1983 and in 1974 respectively. Apprehending international 
influence on democratization is exceptionally significant by the time that many 
governments and international institutions declare supporting democratization as a 
foreign policy objective. Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe officially 
declares that it supports and brings democracies together in the axis of common goal of 
security. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development affirms that 
membership is exclusive to democracies, while the organization secures budget for 
supporting democracies. Similarly, the European Union has the self-declared mission of 
spreading democracy, rule of law, and human rights in its neighborhood. However, 
without correctly assessing features of international context of democratization, policy-
objectives as well as democratization attempts of those countries might be at least 
adversely affected, if not hindered.  
  
 What do the Turkish and Greek democratizations say? 
Evidently, comparison between two cases has its limits in terms of deriving 
theoretical generalizations concerning the international influence on democratization. 
Nevertheless, analysis of the Turkish and Greek democratizations in 1983 and in 1974 
respectively were helpful in terms of refining the theory, discovering limits of the 
existing literature, and providing inspiration for further research. These two cases 
demonstrated that international forces are significant and ignoring this variable leaves 
any explanation of democratization incomplete. Mechanisms and tools of the 
international pressure for transition such as diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, 
fertilization of democratic culture, and support for and legitimization of opposition at 
home have significant impacts on the authoritarian regimes that their presence cannot be 
neglected. On the other hand, international actors might contribute to consolidation of 
democracy by assuring key elites that democracy will benefit them, by legitimizing pro-
democratic actors and by offering material benefits in the name of security, domestic 
stability, or direct economic benefits in order to encourage stiffening of democracy in a 
country. 
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 In the first chapter, I argued that the international community utilized those 
mechanisms and tools in order to bring the existing authoritarian regime downs in 
Turkey and in Greece and to support democratization. Both Turkey and Greece were 
threatened with diplomatic isolation while the case might be seen more imminent for 
Greece. Additionally, they were imposed economic sanctions by the European 
Community and by several foreign governments in order to deprive junta from 
legitimacy and reduce regime sustainability. In Greece, Western European governments 
and European institutions supported the pro-democratic opposition, while, both for 
Turkey and Greece, they turned to vocal points of criticisms concerning human rights 
violations of the opposition. Those international actors used the agency of media in 
order to voice their criticisms against the junta and their support for democracy.  
In addition to demonstrating the fact that the international actors can have 
influence on transition, the Turkish and Greek cases indicated that those mechanisms 
and tools could be effective only in relation with domestic factors. Indeed, in the 
Turkish case, diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions were not as harsh as the 
Greek case. Moreover, the external factors did not provide support for the opposition at 
home in Turkey in transition period, while, the opposition in Greece was actively 
supported. Nevertheless, Greek junta did not collapse because of international pressure 
in the direction of democratization but due to the Cyprus war. Contrary to its Greek 
counterpart, the Turkish military retracted from power by prioritizing the external view 
on the regime, as the generals themselves stated on certain occasions. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that the international community was successful in encouraging voluntary 
disengagement of the military and quick return to democracy in Turkey.  It is ironic that 
it failed to do so in Greece even if it implemented harsher sanctions in order to support 
democratization. 
 This can be attributed to the different paths and subjects of elite socialization in 
the Turkish and Greek cases. In the Turkish case, the very power-holders of the regime 
socialized into Western values and Western type of government. The Turkish military, 
as its historical role of Westernizing and modernizing the country urged, overrated the 
Western European opinion. This importance attached to the European opinion made the 
threat of expulsion from the Council of Europe so effective and convinced the generals 
to delegate the authority to the civilians as soon as possible. The Greek colonels, on the 
contrary, were indifferent to international pressure and once they were isolated from 
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their Western allies, they attempted to search for legitimization by allying themselves 
with the Eastern European and the Middle Eastern countries. It can loosely be 
concluded that socialization of power holders concerning Western type of government 
might be more effective than diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed on 
authoritarian regimes although impact of these mechanisms cannot be neglected. 
In the second chapter, I contended that the Turkish and Greek consolidation 
paths stand distinct. One of the differences was the impact of different international 
context of transition. Borrowing from Agüero, I claimed that transition path might 
affect democratization process. Following that, I argued that the lenient attitude of the 
international forces on the Turkish military regime had negative impact on 
consolidation process. By failing to delegitimize the military regime, if not legitimized 
it, the international community contributed to the ability of the military to secure 
institutional prerogatives following the transition.  It is worth-mentioning that harsher 
sanctions on the Greek military did not lead to voluntary disengagement like the 
Turkish case. However, it was more conducive for democratization and demilitarization 
of the regime by depriving the junta of legitimacy. 
Turkish and Greek cases, also, varied in terms of the international context of 
democratic consolidation attempts. The European Union successfully supported Greek 
democratic consolidation by offering security, economic, and stability benefits to the 
country which were significant enough to render a democratic reversal unthinkable and 
by legitimizing democratic forces so as to stimulate democratic compliance of all the 
politically significant groups. On the other hand, in the Turkish case, the European 
Union did not offer full membership in order to strengthen fragile Turkish democracy as 
it was the case in Greek consolidation phase. Moreover, in the Turkish case, the 
prospect of full membership has remained blurred even after the country was declared 
as an official candidate. Although, the Union has legitimized pro-democratic efforts and 
groups in Turkey and has criticized the role of the armed forces in politics, it failed to 
support the civilian pro-democratic elites so as to stiffen their position vis-à-vis the 
military establishment. Moreover, it has imposed further economic and political 
sanctions on the civilian governments which substantially weakened their attempts to 
capitalize on the international links for further democratization. 
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Finally, the Greek and the Turkish consolidation cases reinforced the thesis that 
democratization unfolds in relation to both external and internal dynamics. It would be 
quiet misleading to assume that polities stand in isolation in the international system. 
Yet, it would be equally wrong to analyze impact of international forces on 
democratization without considering domestic factors. In increasingly interdependent 
world, external and internal factors are blended to a large extent and focusing on one of 
them would leave the explanation on democratization incomplete. 
 
Existing Literature and Further Study 
This study demonstrated that the literature remains limited on the international 
context of democratization both in quantity and quality. The number of studies on the 
topic is scarce, while the existing ones solely focus on the tools and mechanisms of the 
international actors and external influence on democratization. This leaves the 
interaction between those international forces and domestic dynamics under shadow 
which shall be indeed the main point of analyses. As the common wisdom would urge, 
every country is not expected to react in the same way to the same external influence. 
For instance, despite relatively lenient attitude of the international actors while 
sanctioning the authoritarian regime in Turkey, the military voluntarily disengaged due 
to the international pressure, while the colonels’ regime did not come to an end due to 
harsh sanctions. Similarly, while economic and political sanctions might be effective in 
supporting democratization in different cases, it failed to assure consolidation of 
Turkish democracy due to relevant civil military relations. In this aspect, as many 
scholars acknowledge, there is a need for a parsimonious theory concerning the 
interaction between the international forces and domestic dynamics in the literature (See 
for instance, Magen, 2009; Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004). 
 A deliberate theory would require further study on different cases by expanding 
the sample. For instance, those cases where the international forces failed to bring 
democratization despite utilization of all those mechanisms such as Russia and the 
Central Asian Republics, countries which are in transition but not fully democratic such 
as Ukraine, and possibly the champion example of authoritarianism the Middle East 
countries as well as successful cases of the Central and Eastern European countries 
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could be studied in comparative perspective in order to grasp the impact of international 
forces on democratization. 
 Moreover, the literature tends to focus on the European Union as the sole actor 
which supports transition to democracy and democratic consolidation.  Explanations 
regarding the sole inclusion of the EU seem to be tentative and emphasis on the role of 
the EU hinders possibility of theoretical generalizations. It might be useful to figure out 
the underlying reasons of the EU’s ability to support democratization. This would 
contribute to the theory and demonstrativeness of the literature on the international 
context of democratization.  
 In addition to pro-democratic international pressure, negative international 
influence on democratization might be studied. In the end, the literature is unable to 
answer to the question if the international context always encourages democratization. 
In this study, the US, for instance, seems to present a negative force in terms of 
democratization both in Turkey and in Greece, in 1983 and in 1974 respectively. It 
provided aid to the authoritarian regimes and attempted to ensure international 
acceptability of them. However, it was hard to fit the attitude of the US in the theory. 
Therefore, with different case studies, systematic tools and mechanisms of anti-
democratic international forces and the underlying reasons of support for authoritarian 
regimes might be studied. 
 In the end, the international context of democratization stands as a field, open to 
further improvements with more scholarly debate and case studies. This thesis aimed to 
discover the limits of the literature by applying the theory to two cases, the Turkish and 
Greek democratization attempts in 1983 and in 1974 respectively. Although, it 
demonstrated some theoretical conclusions about the international influence on 
democracy and democratization, there is still a lot more to say and criticize about what 
has been said. 
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